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The war on terror and the war in Iraq have occasioned a ferocious
debate over the Bush administration’s commitment to
neoconservatism as the guiding philosophy behind war aiming at
democratic transformation. Two recent, widely noticed 2006 books
have attacked neoconservatism—one, by a former neoconservative,
Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads,
and a second, by a centrist liberal, Peter Beinart, The Good Fight:
Why Liberals – and Only Liberals – Can Win the War on Terror and
Make America Great Again. Each seeks to anatomize
neoconservatism and what, in each author’s view, has gone wrong
with it; each seeks to offer an alternative foreign policy. This review
essay examines the two books, considering the respective cases they
make against neoconservatism and the rationales it has provided for
the Iraq war and the war on terror.
The essay considers the broader intellectual framework of
neoconservatism and its history within American conservatism, and
the long-running American foreign policy debate over realism and
idealism, setting out a seven point schema of neoconservative
doctrines. It is respectful of Fukuyama’s critiques, and particularly
the internal contradictions that Fukuyama identifies within and
among neoconservative premises that have led to what Fukuyama
sees as disastrous policies. Still, this essay does not believe—even
granting the strength of the critiques—that Fukuyama has decisively
knocked down the entire neoconservative case for the Iraq war or,
more broadly and importantly, the neoconservative commitment to
democratic transformation as against realist doctrines of the
accommodation and stability of corrupt or wicked authoritarian
regimes.
With respect to Beinart, this essay praises his call for the
Democratic Party to recognize that the fight against transnational
Islamist terrorism is really a fight against a form of totalitarianism,
and hence similar in certain respects to the Cold War. However, it
rejects Beinart’s characterization of neoconservatism and Bush
administration foreign policy as likewise a threat to American
values, different in degree but not necessarily in kind. The essay also
rejects the new foreign policy proposed by Fukuyama or Beinart—
amounting, in each case, to a version of increased realist
multilateralism, what Fukuyama calls “realistic Wilsonianism”—
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concluding that each is guaranteed from the outset to be merely
ineffectual.
The essay proceeds, first, by considering Fukuyama’s detailed
history and critique of neoconservatism. It next considers the left
reaction to neoconservatives failures in Iraq—the emergence of a
new liberal realism—and takes up Beinart’s critique of this liberal
move away from idealism. Third, the essay examines Fukuyama’s
argument against neoconservatism from sociological premises, and
especially the grave error of multiculturalism as a replacement for
liberalism in dealing with Muslims within Western societies. Fourth,
the essay largely agrees with Fukuyama’s invocation of a new
emphasis on international development and nation-building in ways
that accept their slowness and limitations. Finally, the essay
considers the alternative foreign policy approaches put forth by
Fukuyama and Beinart, and finds them each finally lacking.

I
Neoconservatism in American foreign policy is over and Francis
Fukuyama has written its obituary. And now that the hoopla
attending his book’s release has died down—the charges and counter
charges, accusations of betrayal and bad faith, angry denunciations
and bitter recriminations, ruptures of friendships and breaking of
intellectual alliances1—perhaps it is possible to give sober

1. For example, in 2004, Francis Fukuyama criticized Charles Krauthammer’s
2004 prestigious Irving Kristol Lecture at the American Enterprise Institute,
finding it “disconnected from reality” because it did not address the failures in
already then evident Iraq. Krauthammer responded by accusing Fukuyama of
purposefully ignoring the threat religion poses to national security, noting that
Fukuyama “made his reputation proclaiming” that the world faced an “end of
history.” See Francis Fukuyama, The Neoconservative Movement, NAT’L INT.,
Summer 2004, at 57, 58; Charles Krauthammer, In Defense of Democratic
Realism, NAT’L INT., Fall 2004, at 15, 18. The following year, Fukuyama resigned
from his position on the editorial board of The National Interest over a
“philosophical disagreement” regarding the “narrowly realist foreign policy” of the
Nixon Center, the magazine’s new owner. See also David Kirkpatrick, Battle Splits
Conservative Magazine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at § 4 at 12 (noting
Fukuyama’s intent to start a new publication, The American Interest, with other
dissenting members of The National Interest, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Eliot A.
Cohen, and Josef Joffe).
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consideration to Fukuyama’s farewell, more-in-sorrow-than-anger,
After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads.2
The bitter arguments over Fukuyama’s book took place not just
among conservative think-tank intellectuals in Washington D.C.,
however, and it would be a mistake to write them off as simply
internecine warfare of no special moment among one sector of the
chattering classes. The most incendiary moment of debate occurred
when the conservative pundit Charles Krauthammer—who in 2004
delivered an address cited by Fukuyama as a proximate cause of his
apostasy3—accused Fukuyama in the Washington Post of grossly
misrepresenting his speech.4 Krauthammer, by my reckoning,
appeared to be right about the specifics of his lecture, and yet I also
reckon Fukuyama generally right about the ideological triumphalism
generously spread among American conservatives even at a time
when it was obvious that winning in Iraq was more than a matter of
merely removing the dictator and letting democracy take its lovely
course. Remarkably, too, the White House entered what might have

2. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, AFTER THE NEOCONS: AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS
(2006). References to this book will be shown throughout the text in the form (F
page).
3. Charles Krauthammer, Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy
for a Unipolar World, The Irving Kristol Annual Lecture, 2004 (Feb. 10, 2004),
available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf. In this speech
at the American Enterprise Institute, Krauthammer dismissed the four major
schools of American foreign policy: isolationism, liberal internationalism, realism,
and democratic globalism as incorrect paths for the United States, recommending
instead democratic realism as a fifth alternative. Id. The main tenet of
Krauthammer’s democratic realism is the necessity for the United States to be
involved only in those regions that are critical to its security such as the “Islamic
crescent stretching from North Africa to Afghanistan.” Id. at 18–19. The irony is
that Krauthammer’s realist position in this speech itself is a partial rebuke to the
idealist assumptions of neoconservatives.
4. Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed., Fukuyama’s Fantasy, WASH. POST, Mar.
28, 2006, at A23 (“It was, as the hero tells it, his Road to Damascus moment.
There he is, in a hall of 1,500 people he has long considered to be his allies,
hearing the speaker treat the Iraq war, nearing the end of its first year, as ‘a
virtually unqualified success.’ He gasps as the audience enthusiastically applauds.
Aghast to discover himself in a sea of comrades so deluded by ideology as to have
lost touch with reality, he decides he can no longer be one of them. And thus did
Francis Fukuyama become the world's most celebrated ex-neoconservative, a welltimed metamorphosis that has brought him a piece of the fame that he once
enjoyed 15 years ago as the man who declared, a mite prematurely, that history had
ended.”).
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been thought purely an intellectuals’ brawl—sending off emails
quoting Fukuyama’s past statements in contradiction to the new
positions in his book, particularly his 1998 support for the United
States forcibly to overthrow Saddam—joining the melee for the very
good reason that, as Tod Lindberg, editor of the Hoover Institution’s
Policy Review, put it, the Bush administration has “been more
influenced by Mr. Fukuyama’s work than by that of any other living
thinker.”5 Betrayal, bad faith, denunciation, recrimination, and
rupture, indeed.6 Meanwhile, liberal commentators and reviewers
watched the feuding with a mixture of prim righteousness and
undisguised glee at the long-awaited conservative crackup over the
intellectual bases of the Bush administration’s foreign policy.7
The work that Lindberg had in mind as influencing the Bush
administration was of course Fukuyama’s 1992 The End of History
and the Last Man, a volume that began as an article while he was at
the Rand Corporation,8 the quintessential Cold War think tank.9 That

5. Tod Lindberg, Op-Ed., In Full Pursuit of Democracy, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
21, 2006, at A19 (detailing the feud between Fukuyama and the Bush
administration).
6. Fukuyama was not slow to respond to Krauthammer’s Washington Post
attack. Francis Fukuyama, Editorial, Debating the War in Iraq (Round 3), WASH.
POST, Apr. 1, 2006, at A15 (responding in a Letter to the Editor a few weeks after
publication of Krauthammer’s article). Fukuyama wrote that Krauthammer
mistakenly asserted that Fukuyama changed his support for the war in Iraq only
after public opinion on the war began to shift. Fukuyama states that he wrote
several articles in 2002 in which he began questioning the United States’ mission
in Iraq and noted that he never wrote an article in support of the war.
7. See—each reviewing After the Neocons—for example Martin Jacques,
Critical Thinking: Bush’s Foreign Policy is Under Fire From a Former Prophet of
Neo-Conservatism, GUARDIAN, Mar. 25, 2006, at 7 (book review); Anatol Lieven,
The Man Who Changed His Mind, NEW STATESMAN, Mar. 27, 2006, at 48–49
(book review); Paul Berman, Neo No More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, § 7 at 1
(book review); Michiko Kakutani, Supporter’s Voice Now Turns On Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at E1 (book review); Louis Menand, Breaking Away:
Francis Fukuyama and the neoconservatives, NEW YORKER, Mar. 27, 2006, at 82–
84 (book review); Perry Anderson, Inside Man, NATION, Apr. 24, 2006, at 23–29
(book review).
8. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992);
Francis Fukuyama, The End Of History, NAT’L INT., Summer 2004, at 3.
9. Which is not to say the Rand Corporation is or was conservative, but rather
that it was always anti-communist in the Cold War sense that shaped the American
political center, in domestic as well as foreign policy, from Democratic presidents
Truman and Kennedy to Republican presidents Nixon and Reagan.
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book, written in the flush of victory in the Cold War and the collapse
of Soviet Communism, argued that we were on the cusp of a
historical moment in which history itself—at least “history” in the
sense of fundamental arguments over political ideology—was
essentially over. Liberal democracy, market capitalism, and the
welfare state had won, for the reasons that they are both right in
principle and have been proved right in practice, while their 20th
century totalitarian, collectivist competitors, Communism, Nazism,
and Fascism, have all been seen off. Despite the disdain of some
academics, The End of History hit the intellectual zeitgeist of the
1990s in the United States perfectly—as perfectly in tune with the
post-ideological tenor of the Clinton administration as with
conservative celebration of democratic capitalist victory—and
Fukuyama eventually became a celebrity professor at the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington
D.C.
The Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, Chechnya, North Korea, Cuba,
Haiti, Chinese Communism, failed states, authoritarian states,
backsliding in Russia, Saddam’s Iraq, the mullahs in Iran, and the
Taleban executing women qua women in Kabul—well, okay, even in
the hopeful, post cold war 1990s everyone understood that progress
would be only gradual and there would be setbacks. But the basic
institutions and values of democracy, human rights, liberalism, the
secular public-private divide, free markets, the emancipation of
women, and social protections were accepted worldwide and not
really open to question. The nightmare of modernity—Orwell’s
1984—had been successfully avoided. Fukuyama himself moved on,
partly to fleshing out certain of the institutions of cultural values that
made liberal capitalism work,10 partly to working out the problems of
failed states,11 and partly to arguing how to avoid that other dystopia
of modernity—Huxley’s Brave New World—which, while infinitely
more pleasant, challenged the underlying premises of being human.12

10. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND CREATION OF
PROSPERITY (1995).
11. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004).
12. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002).
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Alas, as we now know, other intellectuals were also at work in
those same years. They too were dreaming their dreams of a politics
and a history. Theirs, however, were dreams not of the end of
history, but instead its re-birth and, for some, even the return of the
Twelfth Imam, the re-birth of politics, history on the march, a march
long stalled by centuries of Western expansion but reinvigorated by
contemporary global demography and mass migration. A history
simultaneously older than old and newer than new, pre-modern in its
deployment of ancient Islamic doctrines, but post-modern in its
highly selective use of them and in its deployment of the cutting edge
of the West’s very own anti-Western ideologies of multiculturalism,
anti-colonialism, and ressentiment, all at the same time—a distinctly
pre-modern, yet post-modern alternative to modernity and
particularly its secular liberal capitalist form. It too conceived of an
end-time of ideology—not our polished, commercial, secular,
capitalist, democratic civil society writ global, but instead a
worldwide, politicized umma.
Pre-modern and post-modern, yes—but never modern in that
term’s formal sense, the way in which we are modern. But they wrote
down their visions and grand strategies in languages few of us
understood, even as they took full advantage of modernity’s
technologies to post their manifestos on the Internet. They lived in
grimy, slummy, unglamorous places in the second and third worlds
few of us visited as we went about with our Lonely Planet guides,
admiring reformed South Africa, its game parks and lovely Cape
Town, so full of rainbow, pluralistic promise, went to the beach in
Thailand and Bali, climbed Kilimanjaro and lamented the loss of
primate habitat to war and poaching, hiked from Cuzco to Machu
Piccu where we heard stories of the ancient Incas and not-so-ancient
Sendero Luminoso, and worried about the decline of the Cloud
Forest in Costa Rica. They, meanwhile, organized among
modernity’s resentful left-overs in the great cities of Europe where, it
is true, many of us also lived, only they lived in neighborhoods few
of us ever visited, the banlieues of Paris and the storefront mosques
of Bradford and Hamburg, and they, those same intellects, vast and
cool and unsympathetic, regarded this earth with envious eyes, and
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slowly and surely drew their plans against us.13 Great believers in
praxis as well as Allah, patiently connecting theory to action, umma
to jihad, preacher to terrorist, liberation to the burqa, what had they
to do with the end of history conceived as the triumph of the
complacent bourgeoisie?
The End of History and the Last Man, in other words, is indeed a
splendid disquisition on the end of alternatives to liberal democratic
capitalism within modernity—Communism, Nazism, Fascism. But
what does it offer if the alternative is not genuinely modern? After
all, that book only briefly, passingly mentions Islam (although, it
must be said, that the fact that in 1992 it even mentioned Islam at all
is a tribute to the book’s precocity). Much of the anger directed at
Fukuyama’s After the Neocons by neoconservatives and by Bush
administration intellectuals arose from the perception that Fukuyama
intended The End of History, in the rosy glow of the fall of the Wall,
to be a universal pronouncement, applicable across the world and
history—not limited merely to the ideologies of modernity. That is
how they took it and sought to implement it as an Ur-text of
neoconservatism. In his new book, however, Fukuyama does not
appear to say that he now recognizes that The End of History was in
fact limited to the 20th century’s struggle among modernity’s
ideologies. Whereas, post 9/11, we all recognize that something new
is in play. Instead he suddenly and unexpectedly appears to believe
that neoconservative policymakers and intellectuals misread him,
and that he never meant it to be universal after all.14 The result being
13. H.G. WELLS, THE WAR OF THE WORLDS 3 (Tom Doherty Associates, LLC
1988) (1898).
14. To be exact:
Many people interpret my book The End of History and the Last Man (1992)
as arguing . . . that there is a universal hunger for liberty in all people that will
inevitably lead them to liberal democracy, and that we are living in the midst
of an accelerating, transnational movement in favor of liberal democracy.
This is a misreading of the argument. The End of History is finally an
argument about modernization. What is initially universal is not the desire for
liberal democracy but rather the desire to live in a modern society, with its
technology, high standards of living, health care, and access to the wider
world. . . . Liberal democracy is one of the by-products of this modernization
process, something that becomes a universal aspiration only in the course of
historical time.
FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 53–54 (footnote omitted). To which neoconservatives
retort, that is how you interpret yourself now, but what you said in The End of
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that it is their fault, not his, for not recognizing the limits of what a
policy of promoting democracy and liberalism in the Middle East can
get you and, more pertinently, what it cannot. The neoconservatives,
in the Bush administration and out, on the other hand, accused
Fukuyama of profoundly changing his mind but refusing to admit it.
In what Lindberg called the “Lucy, Charlie Brown, and the football”
analogy, the administration faithfully teed up the Fukuyamian
football of liberal democracy in Iraq and the Middle East only to
have Fukuyama himself snatch the ball away at the last moment.15
And then, adding insult to injury, Fukuyama goes and denies having
done so and says instead that if only he were read properly, it would
have been clear that the ideological possibility of liberal democracy
was never really there, or anyway so hedged up by the long term
Burkean requirements of culture slowly, slowly accreting social
preconditions conducive to democracy that it amounts to it not really
being there at all.16

II
But this gets us ahead of ourselves. In order to get there, we must
go back to how Fukuyama frames the sins of neoconservative foreign
policy in After the Neocons. The book is not long but offers an
argument in five large steps. It first defines neoconservatism as a set
of linked beliefs about social policy while exploring the political and
social backgrounds of the intellectuals who framed its arguments. It
then argues that key tenets of neoconservatism were systematically
violated in making the case for the Iraq war, to what Fukuyama sees
as disastrous effect. It argues that the broader war on terror is illserved not only by the Iraq war, but also by the project of democratic
reform in the Middle East, because, Fukuyama argues—following
such writers as Olivier Roy—Islamist extremism is a phenomenon
less of the Middle East than of the disoriented modernity of Muslims
in the West, and Western Europe in particular.17 It turns to consider
History in 1992 is much, much stronger than that. Although, like Lindberg, I
regard myself as friendly to both camps on this point, I believe the
neoconservatives have the more accurate reading of Fukuyama in 1992.
15. Lindberg, supra note 5, at A19.
16. Id.
17. See OLIVIER ROY, GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH 1,
22–38 (2004) (arguing that the Islamic revival or “re-Islamisation” is the result of
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the requirements of policies of international economic development
and long term nation-building—almost entirely ignored by
neoconservatives, single-mindedly intent upon on security issues—to
address particularly the myriad problems of failed states and their
tendency to become safe havens for jihadist terrorists. Finally, the
book offers an alternative for what should replace neoconservative
foreign policy—something that Fukuyama calls “realistic
Wilsonianism” (F 9). That is, rather than attempting to make, or
remake, what Fukuyama would regard as a genuinely
neoconservative foreign policy that harks back to true
neoconservative postulates, it is “better to abandon the label and
articulate an altogether distinct foreign policy position” and name it
anew (F 7).
Fukuyama’s intellectual history of neoconservatism, both
internally and in its relation to other American approaches to foreign
policy, is fair-minded and sober, shrewd and informative. No doubt
some of those present at the founding will quarrel with one thing or
another in the account of neoconservatism’s rise, but Fukuyama
displays an astute grasp of the movement and its place in American
thought. The fair-mindedness of his exposition of the origins of
neoconservatism is evident in the care devoted not only to laying out
its positions, but to dissecting and dismissing various mistaken,
hostile, or simply mendacious attacks on it. Fukuyama is particularly
helpful in gently dismissing the tendency of the American Left today
to see seemingly endless conspiracies around those who happened to
have studied several generations back with the University of
Chicago’s Leo Strauss, a classicist whose dense theorizing on the
questions of truth and relativism are at once highly sophisticated and
yet philosophically quite conventional, and only tangentially related
to contemporary political theory.18 That Richard Hofstadter’s
the complex forces of globalization such as an increase in the number of Muslims
living in the Western world and deterritorialization). Roy further posits that these
forces cause Muslims to seek the universal community of Muslims, umma, based
on Islamic law, sharia. Id. at 24–26. Bernard Poulet, editor of the French journal
L’expansion, has pointed out to me, however, that, perceptive as Roy is, one must
be very careful in reading him because, as a philosopher, he exhibits a marked
preference for abstract philosophical categories—such as the “global umma”
itself—over concrete historical accounts. It is a point well-taken.
18. At least to me, child of conventional Anglo-American analytic philosophy
and student of Philippa Foot and Rogers Albritton, and someone who heard of Leo
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“paranoid style” in American politics is not limited to the Right is
amply demonstrated by the ever-weirder arguments in the Left
offered today to show that Straussianism, whatever that is exactly, is
something like the Da Vinci Code, the very special secret decoder
ring, for decrypting the Bush administration.19
As a positive political doctrine, Fukuyama says, neoconservatism
is one of four principal approaches to American foreign policy. The
others are realism in the mold of Kissinger, emphasizing power,
stability, and tending to “downplay the internal nature of other
regimes”; liberal internationalism, hoping to “transcend power
politics altogether and move to an international order based on law
and institutions”; and finally, in Walter Russell Meade’s term,
“Jacksonian” nationalism, tending to a “narrow, security-related
view of American national interests [and] distrust of multilateralism”
(F 7). What characterizes neoconservatism by comparison to the
Strauss only as an adult and read parts of his work a couple of years ago to find out
what the fuss was all about. I do not pretend to be an expert on Strauss, either pro
or anti, but standing as an outsider to the debate reasonably well informed in
political theory and ethics, I cannot see that it is anywhere so important as the
participants on either side have made out. Moreover, as Fukuyama notes, “it is
even harder to extract an economic ideology from [Strauss’] writing than a
political one.” FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 198 n.19.
19. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 29 (1965) (illustrating the central image of the paranoid style as
“that of a vast and sinister conspiracy, a gigantic and yet subtle machinery of
influence set in motion to undermined and destroy a way of life”). Hofstader
explains that the paranoid style is driven by the notion that the gigantic conspiracy
is “the motive force in historical events.” Id. See, e.g., Scott Horton, The Letter:
Was Leo Strauss Democracy’s Best Friend?, (July 16, 2006),
http://www.balkin.blogspot.com/2006/07/letter_16.html (summarizing the key
criticisms of Leo Strauss, and analyzing one of Strauss’ letter which, Horton
claims, is supposedly key “in understanding Strauss and his politics”); Gerard
Baker, The Neo-cons Did Not Hijack US Policy, FIN. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at 21
(rejecting as political agenda-driven BBC TV films exploring—proclaiming, more
precisely—the alleged conspiracy that U.S. foreign policy is dictated by
neoconservatives, and that Leo Strauss was a “Nazi in his belief in the power of the
Big Lie”); Robert L. Bartley, Thinking Things Over: Joining LaRouche in the
Fever Swamps, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2003, at A19 (tracing the historic roots of the
“Strauss conspiracy,” its link to neoconservatism and criticizing journalists and
independent presidential candidate and political extremist Lyndon H. LaRouche,
for using it in relation to the debate on Iraq); FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at 21
(noting that LaRouche, among others, accused Strauss in a radio commercial of
“propounding a secret antidemocratic teaching and promoting lying on the part of
public officials”).
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others in this array? Fukuyama answers by laying out seven
interconnected propositions that, he says, form neoconservatism’s
fundamental ideological base.20 It is an unimpeachably intelligent
analysis.
First, neoconservatism arose as a highly specific moralizing
doctrine for promoting American security in the ideological struggles
of the Cold War. In the late Cold War, it played idealist antagonist to
conservative Kissingerian realism and, more precisely, the
Kissingerian realism in the days of Nixon and Ford preaching—how
quickly we forget—accommodation to the “inevitable” spread,
appeal, and success of Communism. This was the doctrine of
“declinism,” embraced by the endlessly cynical Nixon and
hopelessly naïve Carter alike. It was only decisively rejected—to the
amazement and derision of most of America’s elites, whether cynical
or naive—by the great hero of the neoconservative movement,
Ronald Reagan. Second, although neoconservatism is about security
in the broad sense of preserving America, both its power and its
ideals, it was and is never about power alone, let alone merely the
maintenance of state-to-state realist stability. It is, rather, a belief in
the power of ideas, ideals, and ideology as necessary conditions of
victory in the Cold War, an understanding that the “mere” words of
Pope John-Paul II were as necessary to the victory over Communism
as NATO’s battalions. Third, neoconservatism asserts that the
internal affairs of states—their attachment to democracy, human
rights, and liberal values—are overall indicators of external state
behavior; predictors, even if imprecise ones, of their tendencies to
war and peace. Fourth, neoconservatism conjoins simultaneously a
belief in the universal validity and appeal of fundamental American
ideals with an equally firm belief in American exceptionalism.
After the Cold War, neoconservatism asserted American
exceptionalism as an American legitimacy to hold and wield
power—not merely as a fact of American power, but as a legitimate
ordering of power in the world, power wielded by a manifestly
imperfect yet reasonably just and moral superpower, bearing
reasonably well the moral responsibility of the powerful to provide a
20. Fukuyama offers four explicitly. I come up with seven by analytically
taking apart the four basic principles that Fukuyama expounds at pages 48–49 and
combining them with other elements of the book.
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minimum level of order in a messy world. It is easy to doubt
America’s qualifications for such a role. But those who do might
contemplate what the alternatives might be—Pax chinana, for
example, a superpower acting only from self-interest, and not the
rather diffuse self interest of Pax americana in maintaining status
quo order, markets, and stability, but interests defined far more
narrowly, and unsentimentally, by a rising, nationalist, internally
undemocratic and externally unidealistic hegemon—a regime for
which the term really fits. Darfur shows the way—China in effect
rents out its Security Council veto upon any threatened hinderance to
genocide in Darfur to the Sudanese regime in exchange, not for any
grand ideological or even security point, but merely for narrow
commercial gain, including that which benefits the family businesses
of senior Chinese politicians and bureaucrats, in energy contracts and
oil interests. Perhaps rising hegemony broadens self interest: perhaps
not.
Fifth, therefore, neoconservatism is unapologetic that American
power can and should be used for moral and ideal purposes—
sometimes directly involving U.S. security interests, such as the Cold
War itself, sometimes in defense of basic propositions of
international order, such as the defense of Kuwait’s sovereignty and
indeed existence in the First Gulf War, but also sometimes in
circumstances where, in the neoconservative view, America should
act from morality alone and even if its security is not directly at
stake—neoconservatives made the muscular moral case, sometimes
successfully and sometimes not, for armed action in Somalia, Bosnia,
Haiti, Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo and, today, Darfur. Sixth,
neoconservatism shares with American realism an abiding
skepticism of international institutions, at least those that go beyond
a certain minimum state-centered multilateralism to invoke
high-minded visions of global governance and the decline of
sovereignty. Neoconservatism not only adopts the realist critique
that, whatever countries high-mindedly say about international
institutions, it is not in fact how they act—it goes a step further, into
the realm of ideals, and says that democratic sovereignty, and
America’s democratic sovereignty in particular, is also an ideal, with
its own moral legitimacy and that insofar as international institutions
seek to undermine sovereign democracy, they are wrong in principle.
Seventh, however, and profoundly different from the six preceding
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propositions—this being the neoconservative belief most derived
from neoconservative domestic policy—neoconservatism holds a
profound “distrust of ambitious social-engineering projects” (F 49).
“The untoward consequences of ambitious efforts at social planning
is a consistent theme in neoconservative thought that links the
critique of Stalinism in the 1940s with... skepticism about the Great
Society in the 1960s” (F 49).
The first six of Fukuyama’s propositions roughly hang together as
the lessons of victory in the Cold War. One may accept them or
reject them, and they exhibit some tensions among themselves, but
Fukuyama rightly sees them as a foreign policy vision broadly
consistent with one another and in any case what neoconservatives
learned from the Cold War, the collapse of Communism, and the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and later the Soviet Union. Accepting
their broad coherence in the Cold War, he instead asks another
question of these propositions. To what extent were these lessons of
the Cold War right in guiding the United States to war in Iraq and,
more generally, in guiding the conduct of the war on terror? Are
these principles perhaps instead the ideological equivalent of the oftnoted tendency of generals to re-fight the last war, with all-too-often
disastrous results? And, going further, Fukuyama notes that the
seventh proposition—the rejection of ambitious social-engineering as
usually doomed to failure and ridden with unintended and
unanticipated consequences—is quite strongly at odds with the other
six propositions. Fukuyama focuses great attention on what he
argues, with considerable merit, is the deep inconsistency within the
neoconservative world-view of believing either that the project of
social-engineering democracy in Iraq could be achieved easily and in
a short period of time by the external device of forcibly removing the
wicked dictator—or that the project could be pursued without
unanticipated negative consequences both within Iraq and geopolitically across the region.
Conjoining the criticism of re-fighting the Cold War and the
concern of neoconservative aversion to social engineering,
Fukuyama argues that neoconservative principles led the Bush
administration to re-fight the last war—the war for the liberation of
Eastern Europe from Communism—and mistakenly to believe that
the Iraq war would fundamentally be the same thing, a release of
pent-up social and cultural energy for democracy, liberalism,
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capitalism, civil society, and the rule of law. Take out the dictator,
release the dictatorial check on these social goods, and these ideals
would all naturally assert themselves. On the contrary, says
Fukuyama—and putting a Burkean spin on the seventh
neoconservative principle—it should have been clear that the social
and cultural pressures for democracy, liberalism, capitalism, civil
society, and the rule of law in Eastern Europe were the result of very
long term cultural pre-conditions that simply are not present in the
Arab Middle East. They are not “natural”; they are the result of
social forces at play over historically long periods of time. In
releasing the grip of the dictator, the United States opened the door
to forces of sectarian, tribal, and other causes of violence and
potential civil war that were not in the lexicon of anticipated
neoconservative consequences. Why not? Because neoconservatives
had mistakenly drawn their template from the fundamentally
Western cultural examples of Europe and modernity.

III
Fukuyama’s is not the ugly, near-racist argument of “lesser breeds
without the Law.”21 Fukuyama’s argument might be unfairly
caricatured as that; in any case, it is a position George W. Bush has
repeatedly and forthrightly assailed, declaring flatly that the desire
for liberty and the dream of freedom are universal and not merely a
Western birthright—only to be ridiculed and scorned, however, by
supposedly “liberal” elites in America and Europe for his arguments
on behalf of liberal universal values—arguments that, once upon a
time, they themselves would have made. Yet we stand in a difficult
position today in which calls for a new realism in foreign policy, as
against neoconservatism, must walk a very fine line between two
closely related claims. The first is the Burkean assertion that
although most individuals, most people, most places, indeed have
what Bush calls a universal desire for freedom and perhaps even for
democracy, not all societies, as collectivities, possess the historical
evolution and social conditions necessary to bring that about—even
allowing for great differences in what those terms mean in concrete
historical and social circumstances. The second is the belief—often

21. RUDYARD KIPLING, Recessional, reprinted in MASTERPIECES (1898).
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unexpressed, but equally often lying just beneath the surface of
contemporary foreign policy debates—that some people, some
peoples, are just incapable of liberty or democracy or selfgovernment of any kind, now and likely forever—to wit, the Arabs.
The line between acknowledging the Burkean constraints of culture,
including religious culture, upon politics, on the one hand, and
cultural essentialism of a very unattractive kind, on the other, is a
very thin one.
But Fukuyama’s Burkeanism is not strictly a realist argument—it
is, rather, a quintessentially realist caution upon moralist action, a
caution that Fukuyama is quite right to say is precisely what
neoconservatives in U.S. domestic policy have typically said to their
blindly idealist liberal counterparts, eager to remake, revise, and
reorder society without thought to the flooding forces they might
inadvertently set in motion, the consequences of social incentives
and disincentives that they cannot now foresee. And its Burkeanism
entails not only the recognition that liberal democracy results from
particular long-term social and cultural matrices that are not
immediately enactable through, for example, mere elections—it is
also the recognition that democracy itself is frankly a fragile social
condition even where it exists, and that its underlying conditions can
be destroyed far more quickly than they can be created. It is a deeply
conservative critique of neoconservatism—exogenously Burkean
while endogenously pointing to a profound contradiction within
neoconservative moral assumptions. It is not precisely realist in the
sense of narrow national interest or mere state stability alone; it is,
instead, the position of a moral realist. It is, in fact, an important
critique precisely because it is so, well, neoconservative.
It is also, however, not at all consistent with my reading, at least,
of The End of History. If Fukuyama’s argument that
neoconservatives ignored at their peril one of their own central tenets
is a fair point, it is likewise a fair point that it is very hard to locate
that danger in Fukuyama’s first book. In the first book, Fukuyama
was a Hegelian triumphalist. In this book, he is a Burkean
cautionary, if not an outright pessimist. It may be Fukuyama’s
discomfort with having changed his mind that accounts for the
peculiar fact that Burke, despite hovering above nearly every
substantive critique Fukuyama makes of neoconservative
triumphalism, barely figures in the actual text of After the Neocons.
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Whereas the epigraph for this book might well have been the young
Burke’s curt response to a Quaker friend seized with passions of
idealism and do-gooding, “I dont like that part in your letter wherein
you say you had the Testimonies of well doing in your Breast,
whenever such motions rise again endeavour to suppress ‘em.”22
But what does all this mean for the debate over the Iraq war?
Unfortunately there is today a too-common response of American
liberals. Many have abandoned, at least for the moment, their
traditional Wilsonian idealism to revel in a mean-spirited realism
usually associated by caricature with the Right—or at least with
Fukuyama’s conservative realists and Jacksonian nationalists. Far too
many liberals have devoted themselves from 2003 onwards to not
merely opposing the Iraq war on the perfectly legitimate grounds that
it was not likely to achieve its aims and risked creating disorder that
might turn out to be far worse—a cure worse than the disease. Far
too many liberals, in order to bolster, if indeed not make, that case,
have systematically downplayed the evil that Saddam had already
done and continued to do and, along with his even wilder sons,
promised to do well into the future. We are living in a weird age of
liberal nostalgia for Saddam’s rule.23 The contrast with the previous
decade of liberal internationalist idealism could not be greater.
22. CONOR CRUISE O’BRIEN,
OF EDMUND BURKE 25 (1992).

THE GREAT MELODY: A THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY

23. I write this today (in Fall 2006) recalling a conversation I overhead—
eavesdropped on—recently in a Washington D.C. coffee house. Two young
women, law students I gathered, were having a serious discussion about the
Lebanon war and the Iraq war. Both, they agreed, were the fault of the Bush
administration. One of the students remarked at length on the Iraq war from the
position of the new liberal realism. It started with why democracy could not work
among such people, and gracefully slid into a remarkably eloquent defense of
Saddam and his regime. She quoted from Nir Rosen, and argued that Iraq and its
people were better off under his reign; she argued that a strongman dictator was
necessary to keep order in a place like Iraq, and that his demonization by the
United States had obscured all the good parts of his regime, especially its respect
for women and freedom of religion. She brushed off those killed by the Saddam
regime as compensated for by the regime’s secularism and regard for women,
because keeping order among the Kurds and the Shias required force, and because
Saddam’s rule was, in any case, less oppressive than the U.S. presence. She
described herself to her friend as a liberal Democrat. I would guess she also counts
herself as a staunch supporter of human rights and an idealist in foreign policy.
This is a speech which is hard to imagine being delivered by someone of her
political affiliations even a couple of years ago. I do not intend to caricature this
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Recall how, during the 1990s, it was taboo in good liberal circles,
in the United States, Canada, or Western Europe, even to suggest that
the Balkan wars were the result of centuries old ethnic hatreds. Or
that any civil war was, or could ever be, the result of ancient ethnic
or religious hatreds. That was wicked conservative realism
announced by morally indifferent Republicans such as James “No
Dog in this Fight” Baker,24 and denounced, for example, by
progressives from Michael Ignatieff to Samantha Power. I myself
delivered such speeches on behalf of Human Rights Watch, although
even then I had qualms about its Whiggish view of history, insisting
with Kantian moral certainty that history itself had to obey certain
categorical moral imperatives—wars are never ascribable to ancient
ethnic hatreds (Yugoslavia),25 no justice-no peace (Sierra Leone),
impunity always rebounds (Chile), etc., etc. Honest liberals will
recall that the official progressive position was that ascribing the
Yugoslav wars to ancient ethnic hatreds rather than the
manipulations of present day politicians—Milosevic and Tudjman—
was an immoral and cynical ploy to avoid getting involved. Today,
on the other hand, card-carrying liberal realism says that—well, as
Democratic Party “netroots” kingmaker, Markos “Kos” Moulitsas,
recently wrote, “[i]t’s clear that in the Middle East, no one is sick of
the fighting. They have centuries of grudges to resolve, and will
continue fighting until they can get over them.”26

young woman; she was not delivering a rant—on the contrary, she was reasoned,
reasonably well-informed, and well-spoken. Perhaps I am unduly influenced by my
own experience digging up Saddam’s chemical weapons victims in Iraq after the
First Gulf War as a human rights investigator, but I found the unapologetic defense
of Saddam chilling.
24. Baker made his famous—or infamous—realist response “[w]e’ve got no
dog in this fight” to answer calls from idealists, both right and left, that the United
States intervene in the Yugoslavia wars in 1991. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just
War and Humanitarian Intervention, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 14 n.32 (2001)
(citing The Road to War, SOCIALISM TODAY, May 1999, available at
www.socialismtoday.org/38/nato38 (quoting Baker, President George H. W.
Bush’s Secretary of State, following his 1991 visit to Bosnia)).
25. See Kenneth Anderson, Illiberal Tolerance: An Essay on the Fall of
Yugoslavia and the Rise of Multiculturalism in the United States, 33 VA. J. INT’L L.
385, 386 (1993) (arguing that the war in Yugoslavia resulted in part from the
States’ “system of pre-modern ethnic power balancing”).
26. Posting
of
Markos
Moulitsas
to
Daily
Kos,
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/7/17/131952/052 (July 17, 2006, 10:19 PDT).
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And Saddam? I recall one prominent human rights campaigner
telling me, back in the Clinton years, back when talking about
dictators was just that, mere talk, that Saddam was one of the three
over-the-edge, current world figures who tiptoed up toward the truly
great criminals of the 20th century, Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot—the
others being Milosevic and Kim Jong Il—for whom one should not
rule out military measures for regime change. But that was under
Clinton, pre-9/11, when it was easy to strike such moral postures,
knowing that the United States would take no military action to
remove him.
Today, however, Saddam has been re-invented as merely another
bad guy in a courtroom that offered insufficient procedural
protections during his trial for what Human Rights Watch, for
example, carefully described way back when, following its
investigations after the First Gulf War, as “attempted genocide.”27
That same human rights monitor declined to offer evidence in the
trials out of concern that the Iraqi court was not sufficiently fair—
partly meaning that its procedures were not sufficiently fair to the
accused, but also meaning not “international” in its composition and
authority, and not authorized by the United Nations—and that, God
forbid, Saddam might even be executed for his crimes.28 Saddam is
currently recalled in the new liberal realism as something not
dissimilar to his own toppled statue of forearms crossing swords over
a street in Baghdad, symbolizing, as rewritten today, stability—and
recalled, in his botched execution, as a figure of even some pity. I am
sorry, but I saw the skeleton of one too many victim of his Anfal
campaign of genocide to join the revisionist parade.
There is little doubt, however, that the dreadful history of
Saddam’s regime has been severely downgraded after the fact in the
new liberal realism. The “Republic of Fear” under Saddam that Iraqi

27. Human Rights Watch, U.S. Needs to Screen Iraqi Opposition Allies (Nov.
21, 2002), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/11/21/iraq4415_txt.htm (using this
phrase to describe the execution of more than one hundred thousand Iraqi Kurds by
Iraqi troops during the 1988 Anfal Campaign).
28. See Human Rights Watch, The Iraqi High Tribunal and Representation of
the Accused (February 2006), http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraq0206
(arguing that the independence of the Iraqi High Tribunal is “already under a
cloud” in part because of the controversial removal of one of its judges).
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exile Kanan Makiya documented,29 for example, has been
wondrously defanged by revisionist Nir Rosen under the new, liberal
realist assertion that regime change in Iraq has made things worse.30
Not just potentially worse if civil war escalates beyond Baghdad and
Anbar province, but actually worse than Saddam and his regime,
taken in its total past and potential future, and for the whole of Iraq,
from Kurdistan to the south: Iraq today in 2005–06, under the U.S.
gun, according to Rosen, is the real “Republic of Fear.” It is a
position embraced by many of the new liberal realists and, I venture,
many readers of this essay. In Rosen’s hands, however, and in the
hands of the new liberal realists, it is far more than even the assertion
that the violence of Iraq today is worse than under Saddam once he
had slaughtered his hundreds of thousands and consolidated power in
a frightening but less bloody police state. In order to get there, it
undertakes a systematic, sordid downplaying of the history of
Saddam’s regime—all those slaughtered, after all, inside the regime
and all those wars of conquest, beyond Iraq’s borders—and, lest we
forget, the continuing possibilities into the future represented by his
sons.
That Iraq today is worse than Iraq yesterday might of course
actually be true, although—even in Fall 2006, as I write this, and
despite the disastrous errors made by the United States on account of
neoconservative dogma—it seems to me not yet in fact so. At this
writing in Fall 2006, civil war properly so-called is still limited to
Baghdad and Anbar province—it is not the case of the south or of
Kurdistan. Complete, widening civil war and ethnic cleansing, across
the whole country might, of course, quickly emerge, and it might
indeed turn out finally to be worse than Saddam’s Iraq or that
promised by Saddam’s sons. No Whiggish theory of history here. It
is possible that by the time this essay is in press, in 2007, the
situation will have become worse than Saddam’s once and future
rule. At this writing, following the 2006 midterm elections in which
Democrats took back the House and Senate, the Bush administration
debates troop surges or withdrawals, timetables for the Iraq

29. See SAMIR AL-KHALIL & KANAN MAKIYA, REPUBLIC OF FEAR (1989).
30. See Nir Rosen, Iraq is a Republic of Fear, WASH. POST, May 28, 2006, at
B1; NIR ROSEN, IN THE BELLY OF THE GREEN BIRD: THE TRIUMPH OF MARTYRS IN
IRAQ (2006).

ANDERSON-CORRECTED.DOC

2007]

2/16/2007 4:14:23 PM

GOODBYE TO ALL THAT?

297

government, a unitary Iraq or a soft partition between Kurdish,
Sunni, and Shia zones. I make no prediction as to these actions or
their outcomes. The United States may precipitate a widening civil
war and massive ethnic cleansing through a hasty retreat—or the
same might develop anyway, on its own. All these possibilities and
more are open.
Still, however one reads the turbulent facts of Iraq, the
downgrading of human rights idealism and the embrace of the “hard
men” realism of Brent Scowcroft or Henry Kissinger by American
liberals in the matter of Iraq is wondrous to behold. Likewise the
curious amnesia about earlier, equally fervently-held idealist
positions that apparently only David Rieff has had the admirable
forthrightness to jettison, yet say plainly, without obfuscation, that in
embracing realism he has, in fact, changed his mind.31 Rieff, to his
credit, and practically alone in his clarity and honesty, does not
pretend to have it all ways, nor is he furtive about positions he held a
decade ago, but no longer does.32 This is what makes Rieff serious in
a way that the new liberal realists are not. It is as though American
liberal idealists, long constrained to worship at the church of pious
Wilsonianism, were suddenly freed to go out into the streets for a
Carnival of realism, suddenly freed to expound upon the virtues of
containment, stability, interest, accommodation, and “our
sonofabitch.” What a relief, it seems, no longer always to have to be
so bloody high-minded about human rights in Iraq, genocide against
the Kurds, and so on. Yet this frisson of realism goes along with
either a transparently insincere or else brazenly inconsistent idealist
assertion of how international institutions could and should do all the
things the United States cannot—realism, that is, applied to the
United States as an actor in Iraq with wild enthusiasm but

31. See David Rieff, Muscular Utopianism, WALL ST. J., March 28, 2005, at
A16 (expressing the author’s sense that he is “increasingly aligned with the realist
position”); see also David Rieff, Beware Wars of Altruism, WALL ST. J., July 10,
2003, at A10 (describing the author’s skepticism about whether “the mission of
America should really be to save other nations from their own, homegrown
calamities”).
32. Rieff told me recently, for example, that although he believes he was right
about Bosnia, in supporting intervention there, he now has grave doubts about
Kosovo, although not finally committing himself.
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conspicuously not applied to international institutions of dubious
effectiveness. It is patently not serious.

IV
It is also deeply wrong. Peter Beinart has explained to the
seemingly deaf ears of his own Democratic Party in his new book,
The Good Fight: Why Liberals – and Only Liberals – Can Win the
War on Terror and Make America Great Again,33 that it is not
necessary and far from attractive for liberals suddenly to trash-talk
idealism about democracy, human rights, and universal values
simply because neoconservatives are also idealists. George W.
Bush’s second inaugural address, for example, or his 2005 speech to
the F.B.I. Academy following the London subway bombings, among
many others, announced that henceforth U.S. foreign policy would
be predicated on the universal and nonnegotiable demands of human
freedom.34 It is one thing to attack such speeches as merely
hypocritical, or as not likely to be the case, or as fatally compromised
by U.S. interests, or as simply inflated rhetoric not redeemable at the
bank of U.S. action. But attack because a U.S. president sang the
hymn of human freedom, human rights, and democracy? Because a
U.S. president forthrightly declared that the realism—cynical or
merely realistic—of earlier U.S. administrations had led to the
disastrous situation today, and renounced the unalloyed realism of
his father’s administration, declaring it both wrong and
unsuccessful? How can a principled liberal response be anything
other than a demand to put up or shut up, make good or stand aside
for someone who will? Yes, one can say that the new liberal realism
does not reject idealism, but merely introduces a salutary realist
caution upon it. But that is not, as Beinart amply documents, the
current rhetoric of the new liberal realism, which amounts practically
to a denunciation of idealism as such.
33. PETER BEINART, THE GOOD FIGHT: WHY LIBERALS–AND ONLY LIBERALS–
CAN WIN THE WAR ON TERROR AND MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN (2006).
References to this book will be shown throughout the text in the form (B page).
34. E.g., Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 133, 138 (Jan. 29, 2002); Inaugural
Address, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 74 (Jan. 20, 2005); Remarks at the FBI
Academy in Quantico, Virginia, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1146 (Jul. 11,
2005).
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Beinart’s book, which began as a widely noticed 2004 essay in
The New Republic, tells American liberals that the challenge of
global terrorism is the Cold War of our times, and that prevailing
depends crucially upon Democrats, not Republicans.35 Why
Democrats? Phrased positively, Beinart says it is because Democrats,
and only Democrats, have the necessary values in both foreign and
domestic policy for, so to speak, the good to prevail. Republicans,
and particularly neoconservatives, he says, do not. Phrased
negatively—and Beinart is creditably honest in doing so—just as in
the Cold War, as in the struggle against transnational terror today,
Republican support for national security is not in question—it is
never in question—whereas with Democrats it is. In the struggle
against terror, Republicans speak with a nearly unbroken voice,
whereas Democrats are deeply split. True, there is a virtuous reason,
according to Beinart, why Democrats are split in this way—it is
because they are not solely interested in national security, as the
Republicans are, but are also just as deeply concerned for civil
liberties, especially over the long term. This is, of course, unfair to
Republicans and their own commitment to Constitutional liberties.
But it is also true, Beinart says, that there is a leftwing wedge of
Democrats who view the struggle against terror as either less
important—far less important—than the war against Bush, or else
regard the struggle against terror as merely Bush administration
cover for its wicked policies. Either way, a fight against transnational
terror is not on the priority list for these Democrats. Beinart’s first
call, therefore, is for Democrats today to reach back to their
experience in the early days of the Cold War, and to do what Harry
35. Peter Beinart, A Fighting Faith: An Argument for a New Liberalism, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 13, 2004, at 17. Although Beinart himself admirably stresses that
the United States is engaged in a “war on terrorism” in the same sense as it
engaged in the Cold War—a war against a form of totalitarianism—and criticizes
Democrats for downplaying that fact, I have deliberately referred in this discussion
to the challenge of terrorism, the struggle against transnational terrorism, rather
than the “war on terror.” The reason is simply that at this juncture, pace Beinart,
the phrase “war on terror” refers specifically to Bush administration policy; using
it generically at this point would be tendentious, as it would sweep in a Democratic
response that, in many cases, would not want to regard it as a war at all, or in any
case not want to be identified with the specific policies of the Bush administration.
Hence the more generic, if unfortunately vaguer, references. See Kenneth
Anderson, Law and Terror, POL’Y REV., Oct.–Nov. 2006, at 3, available at
http://www.policyreview.org/139/anderson.html.
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Truman had done sixty years before—marginalize and then
excommunicate the so-called Wallace Democrats, the leftwing
Democrats of that day who were soft on Stalin, the Soviet Union, and
Communism. Beinart calls upon today’s mainstream Democrats to
assert themselves and do the same thing to the leftwing of the
Democratic Party that has effectively decided either that terror is not
really a threat, or not a significant threat compared with the graver
threat posed by the Bush administration, or anyway a threat that does
not require any significant response beyond, perhaps, securing the
ports but not the borders—the Moveon crowd, the Dean Democrats,
the ‘netroots’ crowd.
Particularly given the criticisms that follow, Beinart’s intellectual
and moral achievement—recognizing that Islamist terror is a form of
totalitarianism—must be given full and complete credit. Islamist
terrorism is a totalizing ideology, a totalitarian ideology inimical to
human freedom, one which must be fully and forcefully opposed by
those who value the inheritance of the Enlightenment. Beinart has
said this more plainly than perhaps anyone else, Republican or
Democrat, on the left or right. Moreover, he has said this to his own
party—which on this point, he says remains deeply in denial, morally
and intellectually AWOL, and only too willing to shoot the
messenger. Having thus faulted Democrats for entertaining
appeasement as a policy, or at least for refusing to confront the
appeasers in the party, Beinart turns to argue that Republicans, and
neoconservatives in particular, are morally and intellectually
incapable of winning the fight against terrorism.
Republicans and neoconservatives are led astray by their blind
faith in overwhelming American power, by the hubris of American
might, and by the temptation—which Beinart calls the “most
dangerous” of all—to “tell Americans they are inherently good” (B
129). It leads them to war as the first and practically only response.
They neglect, according to Beinart, other avenues: diplomacy,
containment, allies, the virtues of patience, the long-term cultural
advantages of freedom and a constitutional order that has survived
many crises. Republicans are united on the issue of national security,
yes, but even unified they cannot actually win the struggle, because
their values are too narrow and frequently wrong. Neutralizing the
appeasement wing of his Democratic Party, on the one hand, and
showing why Republicans cannot succeed on their own policies, on
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the other, Beinart urges Democrats to reinvigorate domestic and
foreign policy liberalism—to wage a struggle against a jihadist
terrorism that is really a form of totalitarianism—but to do so as an
expression of Democratic Party values, at once muscular and liberal.
“Winning the war on terror and reviving liberalism,” he says, “are
two sides of the same fight” (B xiii).
Such a policy would not include an Iraq war. Beinart initially
supported the Iraq war, but in the book loudly recants, today finding
it insufficiently related to the war on terror. But neither would
Beinart’s new Democratic policy shy away from the use of force
against terrorists and in America’s national interests, if circumstance
dictated—as comprehended by virtuous Democratic policy-makers
unafflicted by Republican hubris. It would put America’s pluralistic,
liberal values, as understood by the Democratic Party, front-andcenter in the long-term struggle against terrorism in both domestic
and foreign policy; it would embrace a muscular multilateralism that
would seek real allies. Yet the renewed commitment to
multilateralism and repudiation of Republican unilateralism would
not be allowed unduly to tie America’s hands or forswear the use of
force unauthorized by international bodies if, for example, the United
Nations or the Security Council were manifestly unable or unwilling
to act in a necessary situation.

V
One might be forgiven for asking what, apart from the Iraq war
and a certain rhetorical tone, materially distinguishes this program
from Bush administration neoconservatism. Of Fukuyama’s seven
point account of neoconservatism, Beinart would seem to disagree
with part—but only part—of the proposition declaring the legitimacy
of exceptional American power in the world, wanting it to be
tempered by much greater American humility. He would also differ
from the essential neoconservative distrust of international
organizations—although, even there, Beinart’s embrace of
multilateralism stops well short of European-style worship of
international organizations. Those differences, and the claim (better
articulated by Fukuyama) that neoconservatism lacks certain
essential predicates altogether, particularly those related to economic
development and nation-building that are not directly derivable from
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narrow Cold War national security experience. Even the charge of
Bush administration unilateralism is belied both by the fact that it
attempted—perhaps waiting longer than it should have and perhaps
only on account of political pressure—at least to seek to line up
Security Council approval for its actions, including the Iraq war, and
assembled in any case a sizable ad hoc coalition—which, true, did
not include France. It is not clear that President Beinart—or any
centrist Democrat—would act differently from the Bush
administration template in circumstances where force was deemed
essential by the United States, but the Security Council, for example,
was unwilling. Democrats have already been there and indeed led
the way—the Kosovo war, for example, unsanctioned by the
Security Council and a certain loser to a Russian, and perhaps
Chinese, veto had it been put to a vote. Were Somalia, for example,
to become the new Afghanistan—and well on its way until the
Ethiopian intervention—and were a Hillary Clinton administration to
conclude that it was necessary forcibly to intervene there—in the
teeth, say, of a certain Security Council veto by Russia, China, or
France—it is hard to imagine that its diplomatic method would be
significantly different from that of the Bush administration. Soothing
words that would fool no one aside, how could it be?
For that matter, Bush administration policy on Iran’s nuclear
program—surely one of the two or three most important long-term
foreign policy issues today—has been a model of multilateralism and
deference to our European allies and action through U.N.
mechanisms such as the International Atomic Energy Commission—
and, one might add, with nothing much to show for it, at least as
measured by actually ending or even slowing down Iran’s relentless
march to weaponization. In an effort, seemingly, to underscore
partisan difference, Beinart tends to ignore that it is a prevailing
characteristic of the broad American political center, Democrats as
well as Republicans, to see multilateralism, international
organizations, the United Nations, and the Security Council, in
pragmatic terms; useful when they do, from the broad American
perspective, the right thing, but not things—in the fashion of
Europeans who see these same institutions in transcendental, not
pragmatic, terms—to fetishize and worship for their own sake.
Certainly this attitude smacks of the superpower that can take those
institutions or leave them; certainly it can be ascribed to imperial
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hubris if one likes. But it is not a specifically Republican hubris.
There are indeed differences in how Democrats and Republicans
approach these matters, differences in behavior at the margins, and
above all, differences of rhetoric that greatly inflame national and
international debates. But the substantive differences are not that
great, and in practice amount mostly to whether Western Europe
generally approves of American policy, within or without the formal
structure of the United Nations.
To answer the question of what makes this new policy not merely
somewhat revised neoconservative idealism minus Iraq, Beinart
offers a brief history of America’s early Cold War and the role of
Democrats in it, and later his own critique of Reagan-era
neoconservatism. These accounts aim to establish the analogy of the
Cold War and the struggle against jihadist totalitarianism, the special
and irreplaceable role of the Democratic Party in each struggle, then
and now; and to show why Republican and neoconservative policies
are inadequate and indeed losing responses today.
Beinart’s retelling of the first years of the Cold War is compelling.
He makes a persuasive claim for the unique role of Democrats in
America’s opening moves in the Cold War. After all, it was the Left
wing, the Wallace wing (and also the communist and socialist wings
of the labor movement and the American intelligentsia) of the
Democratic Party that were indisputably soft on communism, the
Soviet Union, and Stalin. The Republican Party had no such wing.36
The firm anchoring of anti-communism by reason of a liberal
alliance that included stalwartly anti-communist labor leaders,
committed simultaneously to expanding the welfare state and civil
liberties yet equally opposed to communist totalitarianism
(something almost entirely missing, for example, in Western Europe)
was indispensable for the long-term national will to succeed against
Soviet Communism. It required enormous political courage for
Americans for Democratic Action to break with labor’s hard-left
flank to embrace the center—courage on the social-democratic left,

36. The Republicans long had, of course, a seriously isolationist wing. It had
been largely extirpated from the moment of Pearl Harbor onwards, and did not
immediately re-emerge in the early years of the Cold War. The Democratic Party’s
isolationist wing—much in evidence today, even if it does not quite dare to speak
its name—did not get going until the post-Vietnam, McGovern years of the 1970s.
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which paid benefits to the end of the Cold War and beyond. It is
precisely this courage that Beinart demands of his party today.
Nevertheless, we can question whether the historical parallel
works so very well with our situation today. The question is
particularly apt in light of the fact that one of Fukuyama’s shrewd
points is to note that neoconservatives also think of the war on terror
as today’s equivalent of the Cold War and that, as he argues, they
have drawn exactly the wrong lessons and are therefore disastrously
fighting, in effect, the last war, not today’s.37 If the parallel is to
work, who then are the Wallace Democrats in today’s Democratic
Party? After all, apart from a few fashionably radical apologists on
university campuses, offering justifications for jihadist terrorism to
undergraduates—Ward Churchill, for example, or University of
Wisconsin lecturer Kevin Barrett, dangling the possibility that 9/11
was a U.S. government conspiracy38—no faction in the Democratic
Party is a fellow traveler with jihad—at least not in the sense of the
Wallace Democrats or committed communists in the mid-twentieth
Century labor movement. What Beinart identifies as the Wallace
Democrats of today are anti-war, anti-Bush, and anti-Republican,
37. It is noteworthy, however, that while Beinart, Fukuyama, and the
neoconservatives all draw upon the Cold War, they use quite different parts of it.
The neoconservatives, and Fukuyama in critique of them, focus upon the late Cold
War, and specifically the Reagan years of the 1980s. Those years are distinguished
by Reagan’s increasing pressure, both ideological and military, upon Soviet
imperialism. Beinart, however, focuses upon the very early Cold War, the opening
years, the Truman years. In those early years, containment of Soviet Communism
was the issue. These differences lead to quite different conclusions about strategic
parallels between the Cold War and the struggle against terrorism. Both
communism and jihadist terrorism are species of totalitarianism—this is Beinart’s
core, compelling observation, the one that gives the rest of his account moral force.
But if you take your lessons from the Reagan years, as the neoconservatives do,
then it leads you to a forward, aggressive, roll-back strategy even if it also leads
you to the error of thinking that liberating Iraq will be like liberating Poland or
Hungary. If you take your lessons from the Truman years, then it leads you to
George Kennan and the Long Telegram, a long-term strategy of containment—
even if it also leads you to the error of allowing containment to embrace
accommodation and never to confront or seek roll-back at all. And to assume,
further that of course Iran will acquire nuclear weapons, just as the Soviets did.
These are remarkably different lessons drawn from the same Cold War.
38. Thus confirming David Brooks’ observation that the universities are where
American society unaccountably chooses to “warehouse its radicals.” DAVID
BROOKS, ON PARADISE DRIVE: HOW WE LIVE NOW (AND ALWAYS HAVE) IN THE
FUTURE TENSE 160 (2004).
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and they put all those concerns and more ahead of counterterrorism—any serious need for which many, being viscerally proappeasers, also doubt. But however willing to try to appease
terrorists, few are genuinely pro-jihad or are jihadist fellow travelers
in the sense of “shared goals” of the communists of the 1930s and
40s.39
It is not clear, in other words, that there is a meaningful analogy
between the special role of the Democratic Party today and its role in
the early Cold War. Anathematizing one’s anti-war, appeasement
wing is not the same as anathematizing a fellow-traveling jihadist
wing that it does not really have. Beinart is undoubtedly correct in
his declaration that if today’s liberals cannot “rouse as much passion
for fighting a movement that flings acid at unveiled women as they
do for taking back the Senate in 2006, they have strayed far from
liberalism’s best traditions”(B xii). And undoubtedly many liberals
have strayed far from liberalism’s best traditions, because a very
large number of American liberals, like their progressive
counterparts elsewhere in the Western world, have concluded that the
Bush administration (and indeed America itself) is the greater threat
to progressivism, not jihad. These progressives do not wish to oppose
jihadism in any way that might actually undermine it, because they
fear that such opposition plays into Bush administration or American
hands. This way lies madness and many, alas, have gone there—but
this passivity, while ultimately suicidal to liberal ideals, as Beinart
says, is nonetheless not the same as embracing jihad. It is instead
“merely” a refusal to engage against it and a specious, in Beinart’s
view, attempt to find ways to appease, rather than defeat, it.
Perhaps the difficulty that Beinart has in answering this question
of how a genuinely muscular Democratic Party counter-terrorism
39. Although one should not underestimate the fringe that is indeed willing to
justify terror against civilians—whether against the United States or, more
typically, Israel—on the argument that it is the only tactic available to the
oppressed, or the occupied, etc. It is easily visible in the wilder neighborhoods of
the Left blogosphere and not just among Palestinian apologists. It starts to overlap
into fellow traveling, not just with terror in general, but specifically Islamic jihadist
terror when combined with the ideological melding of Islam as a religion resisting
Western colonial or neo-colonial oppression. Some of this, of course, is straightout anti-semitism, as well. But these are not the targets Beinart has in mind; he
correctly takes aim at the more mainstream, and vastly larger, leftwing of the
Democratic Party.
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policy would differ from that of the Bush administration—apart from
rhetorical differences and not having fought the Iraq war—accounts
for the weird disconnect between Beinart’s call to revive the Cold
War political center, with Democrats returned to a share in the
central role, and the bitterly partisan anger that saturates his book. It
is, after all, a book titled how “only Democrats” can win the war on
terror and make America great again, and the whole text is devoted
to the twin propositions, as the Hoover Institution’s Peter Berkowitz
has put it in a perceptive review, that while Beinart sets aside the
Democratic Party’s broad belief in “no enemies to the left,” he also
relentlessly indulges the corollary, “no friends to the right.”40 That is
not the formula of the Cold War, however. The long run of the Cold
War was driven by a shared anti-communism, shared across the
parties, the Vital Center,41 that seems at odds with Beinart’s
partisanship.42

VI
Indeed, Beinart is so shrill that it makes me, at least, wonder if he
is genuinely serious about it. Might it be merely strategic posturing?
A way of shoring up his bona fides with the left wing of the
Democratic Party as he seeks to convince it that his muscular
liberalism is really, really not just neo-conservatism minus the Iraq
war? In perhaps the most perceptive remark made about Beinart’s
overall political project, Peter Berkowitz observes that although the
book has been widely praised as a call for the Democratic Party to
40. Peter Berkowitz, War Torn Democrats, POL’Y REV., Aug.–Sept. 2006, at
69,
75
(book
review),
available
at
http://www.policyreview.org/138/berkowitz.html.
41. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE VITAL CENTER: THE POLITICS OF
FREEDOM (1949) (coining the term, “the vital center” as a political philosophy that
eschews the radical ends of the political spectrum in favor of policies in the
center—including a robust commitment to both civil rights and liberties as well as
a faith in freedom).
42. Moreover, not everyone agrees that our contemporary reading of Truman—
including Beinart’s—is an accurate one. See, e.g., Noemie Emery, The
Inconvenient Truth About Truman: His Heirs are Republicans Now, WKLY.
STANDARD,
July
17,
2006,
available
at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/407mnukf.a
sp (claiming that though shunned when he left office, President Truman was later
lauded by both parties, but his policy legacy is now being found principally among
the Republicans, not Democrats).
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move back to the foreign policy center, it is in fact something quite
different:
Beinart’s “antitotalitarian liberalism” certainly represents an
improvement on the anti-imperialist left, which believes that
“liberalism’s real enemies are only on the Right.” Yet in the
process of exposing their error, Beinart reveals the extent to
which he shares it. It’s not, in his view, that the antiimperialist left is wrong to the think the right is driven by
neo-imperialist fantasies that threaten all that Americans hold
dear. Rather, the problem is that his fellow Democrats fail to
include the jihadists also as among America’s great
enemies.43
Beinart’s dialectic therefore finally comes to rest, Berkowitz
concludes, in a “moral commensurateness between the jihadists and
the Bush administration.”44 That was scarcely, however, the example
of Beinart’s great hero, Harry Truman, who somehow managed to
find common ground with the “tens of millions of citizens” who
were “not members of his party.”45
Is Berkowitz right in his reading of The Good Fight? Does Beinart
claim a “moral commensurateness” between jihad and Bush
conservatives? It is a question of what Beinart means when, for
example, he says:
The central question dividing liberals today is whether they
believe liberal values are as imperiled by the new
totalitarianism rising from the Islamic world as they are by
the American right.46
Beinart here anathematizes jihadists, yes—but what exactly does
he mean about the American right? Clearly he sees it, too, as a threat
to American liberal values, a certain moral equivalence of threats,
else why say liberal values imperiled “as they are” by the American
right? The positive aspect of this formulation is for liberals to
understand who the main enemy must be. Yet clearly his position is

43.
44.
45.
46.

Berkowitz, supra note 40, at 80.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting BEINART, supra note 33, at 197).
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that the American right is also a threat—seemingly just a somewhat
lesser threat than jihadism.
It is, to say the least, a problematic formulation even to link
jihadism and American conservatism in the same sentence. It is
reckless, to say the least, to put a violent threat to the entire
American political community—those that brought down the World
Trade Center—in the same sentence as a political philosophy, values,
party, and movement that has roughly half the country as its voters
and routinely—more routinely than liberals of late although not, to
be sure, the 2006 midterms—wins elections. Does Beinart really
wish to link those two? And when he does, can he then still tell us
that he has not drunk the Kool-Aid—what he himself regards as the
Kool-Aid—and joined the Michael Moore crowd? Should we really
take it as such a leap forward, as the book’s admirers seem to have
understood it, for a liberal Democrat to announce that jihad is a
greater threat than... the Bush administration? This was the insight
requiring such intellectual acuity and moral courage? That Beinart
should feel compelled even to structure an appeal aimed at his fellow
Democrats in this way, that it should be praised as an act of great
political courage, and that its courage should consist in conceding
nothing more than that the American center-right is something less of
a threat than Islamist terrorism is, well, shocking.
So The Good Fight in the end sends a disturbingly mixed message.
There is indeed something of real value in it—not so much a soberly
reasoned argument as the move it represents in today’s politics—
because the Democratic Party, as well as the country as a whole,
deserves a center-left foreign policy alternative, alternative to either
the hard left or any part of the right. But that is to treat The Good
Fight as an offering in the political arena, not really as a book. It is a
little bit like policy prescription books offered by candidates at
election time—not intended as books, really, not intended as
anything other than a momentary blip in the political conversation.
But even as a polemic of the moment—a perfectly honorable
genre of political discourse from Jonathan Swift to Christopher
Hitchens—it proceeds confusingly, offering a jumble of arguments
about seemingly any topic, foreign or domestic, that need to be
sorted out more systematically than Beinart seems interested in
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doing.47 The book’s good qualities are also frequently buried beneath
partisan sneers at the Bush administration by which Beinart seems to
aim to maintain his credibility with his Democratic readers. Beinart
and Fukuyama cover much the same ground—the history of
neoconservatism, the Iraq war, the roots of terror, counterterrorism
policy, international development, and the virtues of multilateralism.
Reading The Good Fight causes one to appreciate just how clear and
analytically precise a writer Fukuyama is. After the Neocons will be
around for a long time, because it offers an analytically compelling
account of neoconservatism even as it thoroughly critiques it, and
this will be valuable to future historians seeking to understand the
years immediately following 9/11. The Good Fight is the work of a
moment, a move in an on-going, rapidly shifting political drama; it is
something like information being absorbed into the market—once
absorbed, once priced in, the original source of information is not
really very important as the market in political positions moves on.
But the problem of The Good Fight is much more than style—
after all, if Beinart’s purpose is not to offer an analysis for the ages,
but simply to influence the current debate, then style is not really a
problem at all. The deeper problem, the one that affects whether and
how Beinart is able to affect the current debate, lies in the
fundamental conception of Beinart’s political project, the drive to
reinvigorate the Democratic Party’s political center on issues of
security and terror. Insofar as Beinart insists on linking jihad and
American conservatism—whether in the “soft” form, the ambiguous
form, the innuendo form, or else the hard form, the assertion that
jihad and the American right are separate branches of the totalitarian
family—it codes its own breakdown within its very DNA. It is one
thing to characterize jihad as evil and American conservatism as
wrong or misguided. Beinart, seemingly in the interests of

47. By way of example, consider the impassioned discussion about income
inequality in America in the conclusion of the book. BEINART, supra note 33, at
201–04. Income inequality in the peroration of a book about terrorism, the Iraq
war, WMD, etc.? Yes, of course, you can see how it all fits if you work hard
enough at it—income inequality is a function of globalization, globalization is a
destabilizing force that creates conditions of terrorism, and so on. But by that
standard, pretty much anything that Beinart wants to talk about fits within this
book, and that is how it reads. Fukuyama, by contrast, is highly disciplined and
only introduces new elements as they fit his argument.
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maintaining a connection to where, regrettably, the heart of the
Democratic Party currently stands—and perhaps Beinart actually
believes it, I do not know—instead puts jihadism and the Bush
administration together on a continuum of evil, the former evil and
the latter less, but still, evil. Perhaps even totalitarian, it is hard
definitively to say. This, however, is not a revived Truman policy,
not the Vital Center, not America’s Cold War, not the view of the
majority of the country that voted for George W. Bush in 2004—
even those who abandoned him to vote Democrat in 2006 or might
vote Democrat in 2008—and, most important of all, not true.
Unnoticed by nearly all the commentators, who somehow have seen
in The Good Fight only a vigorous call for the Democratic Party to
reclaim the political center on national security, Beinart’s book in
fact sets a trap for the Democratic Party, one which is liable, in the
end, merely to increase the partisan bitterness. It is a poisoned
chalice at the heart of The Good Fight that ought to give considerable
pause to Democratic Party intellectuals considering its prescriptions
in the run-up to the 2008 presidential election.48

VII
Yet the call made here to return to the American political center is
not the call for a return to some mythical bi-partisan “consensus” that
many mistake it to be. True, a return to the Trumanesque center
would require the acknowledgment, which Beinart seems curiously
unable to make, that the other side acts in good faith, too, and is both
less stupid and less wicked than the theatre of partisanship requires.
True, also, it does require the acknowledgment of shared values—in
the case of Truman’s Cold War, a shared commitment to liberty and
democratic freedoms and their defense.
What the genuinely Trumanesque center does not require is
governing from a putative bipartisan consensus. There are
moments—short moments always in American political life—where
all close ranks: the weeks following 9/11, following Pearl Harbor,
48. See,
e.g.,
the
Truman
National
Security
Project,
http://www.trumanproject.org/index.php (last visited Nov. 19, 2006) (explaining
their belief that the United States faces great threats and must respond with a
strong, cohesive plan for national security formed on the values long-held by
Democrats).
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following the Kennedy assassination, moments of crisis.49 But the
United States is not a parliamentary democracy, and just as we do
not form and un-form governments through votes of no-confidence,
we do not form governments of national unity. The fall of
Chamberlain’s government was precipitated by crisis; Churchill
came to power by reason of crisis. That is not our American
constitutional design. We hold elections on a regular schedule, come
war, come peace, come what may. Perhaps that is a failing of our
constitutional system, but even in moments of crisis, when we close
ranks, we do so behind the existing government and existing
leadership. It ensures that such closed ranks cannot last in an
electoral democracy; the political unity occasioned by the crisis must
inevitably decay. But reliance upon the existing government,
whichever it is, also ensures that the existing leadership must be
accountable to the electorate for how it acts in the crisis, or else it
will lose the next election and be replaced.50 The virtue of a national
unity government is that it erases the ranks of partisanship and sends
a signal to enemies at the gate that the political community marches
to battle as one. But it also significantly lessens accountability within
that community by erasing the clear choice between one government
and its policies and another.
The result is that even America’s Vital Center is not consensually
bi-partisan on actual policies and politics. It involves significant,
sometimes bitter debates and political choices between policies and

49. The New York Times editorial page thought that precisely such a moment
had come when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of George W. Bush in the 2000
election, calling upon Bush to govern as a sort of national unity government, as
recognition of what that newspaper saw as his illegitimacy. But of course that is
not how the American political system works. See Editorial, What Mr. Bush Can
Do, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at A38.
50. The issue of elections upon their regular constitutional schedule even
during national emergencies, such as war, was settled in this country in Abraham
Lincoln’s second election campaign, in the very midst of the Civil War. Lincoln
insisted that “the election was a necessity” and that the country could not “have
free government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forego, or
postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and
ruined us.” Jill Elaine Hasday, Comment, Civil War as Paradigm: Reestablishing
the Rule of Law at the End of the Cold War, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 134
(1996) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Response to a Serenade (Nov. 10, 1864), in 8
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 101 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds.,
1953)).
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governments and leadership. When it falls to a conservative
Republican administration to face the choices forced by 9/11, it must
be expected to do so in a conservative Republican way. The same
will of course one day be true of a future liberal Democratic
administration. The voters will reckon with the results and make
their own choices. That is democracy. So, for example, many aspects
of the current war on terror—which many Democrats would prefer to
see disappear as a “war”—such as the policy for trying detainees at
Guantanamo and elsewhere, now face battles over enabling
legislation and its possible revision by the new Democratic
Congress.51 The battles over proper policy are not, in the American
political system, matters of a specious “consensus”—they are
political battles, policies to be enacted as law by legislative
majorities, in accordance with the priorities and preferences of the
majorities. As majorities shift, those policies will shift; that has
happened today in the 2006 midterm elections shifting legislative
power to the Democrats and it might happen in the 2008 presidential
elections—or it might not. There is a core of values that indeed cuts
across the parties, but they have to do with the commitment to
accepting the bona fides of one’s political opponents, the legitimacy
of their role and standing in our political community.52 It is not about
51. Partly, of course, as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2798, 2808 (2006) (finding that the Bush
administration’s military commissions violated both the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions), but the discussion over
legislating the war on terror goes back further than that. See, e.g., American
Enterprise Institute, Outsourcing of American Law (Feb. 21, 2006), (transcript
available
at
http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.1256/transcript.asp)
(debating what form Congressional legislation governing the war on terror might
take); Washington College of Law & Hoover Institution, Institutionalizing The
War On Terror Through Congressional Legislation (Apr. 10, 2006), (video
available through http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/video.cfm#). See also,
Kenneth Anderson, Law and Terror, supra note 35, at 17, 24 (“This is a
democracy. . . .Congress must have important things to say and enact.”); Kenneth
Anderson, It’s Congress’ War Too, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 3, 2006, at 20–22
(arguing that congressional legislation is “the only legitimate mechanism” for the
formation of counterterrorism policy in a democracy).
52. It is also true, to be sure, that such a system can only work where
historically the two leading political parties have operated within close distance of
the political center. This seems to have been the history of democratic Western
Europe after the Second World War, for example, as well as the United States. It is
an argument made persuasively with respect to post-war Europe by Tony Judt in
his masterful Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (2005)—representative
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accepting any particular policy, at least over the long term as shifting
majorities shift policy. Political appeals—so beloved of newspaper
editorialists, for example—for unity and consensus about particular
policies are doomed to failure because ours is a system of majority
rule. And they should be doomed to failure, because they reduce the
clarity of our choices and hence democratic accountability.
It cannot be said that Beinart undertakes the misguided quest for
consensus. He, after all, effectively excommunicates Republican
foreign policy—at least insofar as it does not match his own—from
the intellectual playing field. But it is a temptation that others should
recognize and reject, while still rejecting the temptation to
excommunicate the other side. For the value of genuinely alternative
foreign policy projects that do not aim at a mythological consensus is
not merely accountability and choice for voters, it is also the
possibility of learning from each other, even while remaining distinct
and alternative intellectual possibilities. Neither neoconservatism,
nor realism, nor Trumanesque Democratic foreign policy, nor any
other alternative, is fixed and immutable. They too are evolving, and
their intellectual adherents, one hopes, are drawing upon both new
ideas and experience to reshape doctrines. Even the neoconservatives
have learned from the experience that began with the Iraq war, but
that learning would be seriously impaired if the intellectual critique
and alternatives were all mushed together in a mistaken effort at
consensus.

VIII
Like Beinart, Fukuyama has a great deal to say about the
neoconservative run-up to the Iraq war; unlike the liberal Beinart, he
opposed it from the beginning, and on impeccably conservative
grounds. Perhaps his Burkean instincts—deriving from the work he
had done since 2000 on the rigors of state-building and the profound
difficulties of creating from scratch conditions of democracy in the
world outside of Eastern Europe—began to kick in. Moreover,
neoconservatives seem not to have read his books on nation-building
democracy has been a success in Western Europe because the main parties, and the
voters, in all their leading do not stray very widely from the center, represented by
a leading center-right and center-left party. The lessons of the Weimar Republic
have not been forgotten in Western Europe.
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and international development, in which he moved well beyond the
abstract beauty, the simplicity, of The End of History to comprehend
the Burkean organic complexity and difficulty of nation-building.
The arguments in the book over what was known and not known
prior to commencing the Iraq war, over weapons of mass destruction
and preemption, will likely not be lasting ones; they are already
being overtaken by events and newly revealed information. The same
is true of The Good Fight. Elites, in any case, have largely made up
their minds about the Iraq war, one way or the other; analyses these
days appear largely to fit pre-conceived narratives and are frankly
not very interesting.
So Fukuyama is largely right in his stinging critique of naïve neoconservatism and its belief that the liberation of Eastern Europe
would repeat itself in Iraq. The problem is that naïve
neoconservatism, while possibly a necessary rhetorical target, is not
the sophisticated target whose support appears to have been
necessary to get the Bush administration to the Iraq war. Naïve
neoconservatives appear—it is early, Fukuyama cautions, for
declaring definitive history—to have been a crucial part of the
coalition for war within the Bush administration; likewise, he says,
the Jacksonian nationalists. But, as Fukuyama explains, these
Jacksonians are not the traditional realists of Scowcroft and
Kissinger’s ilk, but realists of a distinctly different stripe,
characterized, for example, by Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld.
The traditional conservative realists said no to the neoconservative
venture; the conservative Jacksonian nationalists said yes. But
neither Cheney nor Rumsfeld can be characterized as an idealist or a
moralist—or as a naïve neoconservative.
There is a piece missing, therefore, from Fukuyama’s account of
the Bush administration’s war coalition. It is the transformation of at
least some of these realists or Jacksonian nationalists into neoconservatives—or, better said, the convergence of realism and
idealism. Case-in-point is Condoleezza Rice, who, as is well known,
started out as a realist protégé of Scowcroft but emerged as architect
of the Bush doctrine of democracy and universal values as the only
genuinely long-term realist strategy. The realist doctrines of
containment, accommodation, stability, and narrow national interest
are what got us into the current predicament. Idealism is the new
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realism—it is a phrase that has appeared repeatedly in conservative
defenses of the Iraq war.
On this view, which is not the same as naïve neoconservatism, war
for regime change and democratic transformation becomes, in the
instrumentalist calculus of realists, a bet—not naïve certainties, but a
calculated realist bet—on the possibilities of political transformation
weighed against the realist alternative of doing what the United
States had long been doing, and magnified by a certain estimation of
the long-term threat of cooperation with global terrorists in the
transfer of WMD technology. Different people may weigh the
probabilities differently, make different estimations, arrive at
different bets, including the bet on doing nothing much at all. The bet
made in favor of the Iraq war in 2003 today appears to have fewer
and fewer possibilities of payoff, even among those who still support
it, and a necessarily lowered expectation of what “winning” that bet
could even mean. Yet losing the bet does not necessarily mean that it
was an imprudent one; all decisions are easy post-hoc. Call it a form
of neoconservatism, call it moral realism—it is on something like
this calculus that I, for one, supported and continue to support the
Iraq war, writing in Fall 2006. It seems to me a form of argument
that Fukuyama conspicuously fails to address. It is not that
Fukuyama slays a straw man—there were indeed plenty of naïve
neo-conservatives—presumably now much chastened by events. But
there are also plenty of not-so-naïve realist-into-idealists for whom
the bet remains very much live, even as the possibilities and
definitions of winning decline. Fukuyama does not really take
them—us—on. And in any case, although as policymakers and
participating democratic citizens we must weigh possibilities and
make estimations in real time, the time for evaluating the outcome of
events on grand political strategy as a matter of history—the settling
of accounts of whose bets paid off and whose did not—will
inevitably be longer than many are willing to wait.
But Fukuyama has a second, perhaps even more important,
argument against the Iraq war and transformative politics in the
Middle East as a strategy in the war on terror. Drawing, as earlier
noted, on such writers as Olivier Roy, Fukuyama says that
democratic regime transformation in the Middle East will not address
the problems of Islamist extremism and terrorism because they are
phenomena not principally of the Middle East, but of Muslims
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confronting loss of identity once in the West, and in Western Europe
in particular. Even assuming that transformative strategy in the
Middle East precipitated by forcible regime change managed to
stabilize Iraq, so runs Fukuyama’s argument, the social precursors of
terrorism are fundamentally drawn from places we cannot attack
with military force—Hamburg, Birmingham, Lyon, Stockholm,
Berlin, Amsterdam, Oslo, Madrid, Marseilles, Manchester,
Rotterdam, the Paris banlieues, Londonistan. The phenomenon of
Islamist terror is not precisely a sociological problem—it is, rather,
the accumulation of individual psychologies, massed together in
shared and yet still highly individual narratives of resentment,
exclusion, and the search for universals in blended pre-modern and
post-modern Islamist religion, rather than in pluralist modernity.
Islamism is a syncretic blend of pre-modern and post-modern, of
traditional Islam and Western ideology, bathed in resentment—and
its petri dish is the West and not the Middle East. Even if the
birthplaces of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi Arabia and Egypt, their
jihadist spiritual formation was in Western Europe. The Bush
administration launched, on this account, a war that quite missed the
point—targeting the wrong region and, indeed, the wrong country—a
country that was, for all the evil of its regime, relatively secular.

IX
I do not deny the strength of Fukuyama’s psychological
observations. On the contrary, they are an indispensable part of any
deep understanding of the esprit de corps of the terrorists we fight.
The psychological element is indispensable. Understanding the
syncretic nature, the multiple syncretisms, of the enemy’s Islamism
is essential to a successful strategy against it. Its psychology and that
of the larger Muslim world, as its adherents array themselves in
relation to modernity, one person at a time as well as by social group,
are keys to long-term counterterrorism policy, as well as the closely
linked path of social integration. It is a powerful prescription, in fact,
for deep-seated ideological changes in Western societies and their
states—although not exactly, perhaps, the ones Fukuyama had in
mind. The diagnosis of syncretism is a powerful prescription, in fact,
for the explicit, public abandonment of the doctrines of
multiculturalism in Western societies that have so damaged them,
because they reward resentment, legitimize separation, and fuel a
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spiraling demand for special social privileges that amount to
exemption from society’s rules for the resentful and a constriction of
the liberties of the resented. A powerful argument, indeed, for a
vigorous reassertion in its stead of traditional liberalism, and above
all its guarantees of free expression even—of course, rather—for
blasphemy, and the reassertion of a traditional liberal refusal to
tolerate the demands of the intolerant that their intolerance be
tolerated. Allah Akbar? No, on the contrary, as things stand now, the
God of Muslims in the West is not great; his greatness, once brought
into Western societies, has deteriorated into merely a move in a
game, has become merely the grounds for the assertion of religious
privilege wrapped in complaints of discrimination and intolerance by
larger secular society, a means of feeding psychological and spiritual
ressentiment. The real god of the dialectic of Muslims in the West,
alas, the one which confers blessings and answers prayers, turns out
to be the state and its one-way multiculturalism.53
During a visit to Paris a few months ago, I took my daughter to the
Pantheon, where we laid flowers at Voltaire’s tomb. Voltaire? Why
Voltaire? At some point, Europe and America will have to defend
their broadly liberal inheritance.54 The core of that defense is that
‘moderate’ Islam, Islam that can take its place alongside other
religions in a pluralistic Western society, can only exist,
paradoxically, within an iron cage that insists without apology or
reservation that Islam and Muslims tolerate, as Mormons, Catholics,
Jews, Wiccans, Scientologists, and Episcopalians must, the liberal
secular order of public life, without special privileges derived from
arguments of multiculturalism and asserted through carefully
cultivated Western ressentiment. The liberal secular order, the rule of

53. Compare, by contrast, the wisdom of Martin Luther King, who urged his
oppressed followers not to give into resentment, finding in it a certain un-Christian
arrogance as well as the psychological condition of permanent spiritual servitude.
See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS
CRITICS 369–411 (1991) for a discussion of Martin Luther King’s “spiritual
discipline against resentment.” Recognizing “that racial hatred feeds off selfrighteousness and acquiescence,” King fought segregation “without appealing to
[a] history of victimization in order to claim a position of moral superiority.” Id. at
393.
54. An inheritance which is, in America, liberal religious pluralism, to be
precise, rather than the liberal secularism, descended from anti-clericalism, of
Europe.
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law, must be willing simultaneously to protect, with force if need be,
the ability of Muslims to be moderate as against the Islamists, the
extremists and the terrorists. Only a Muslim community which
knows that larger society will not compromise its demands that it be
pluralistic and that it respect and embrace the universal values of a
liberal society, and above all that society’s freedom of expression
including in matters of religion, sexuality, and morality, to
blaspheme and rudely criticize—but which knows also that it will be
protected against the demands of extremists that it acquiesce in their
Islamism, has even the possibility of being moderate. Moderation,
that is, as an active religious doctrine, a positive value a religion
teaches to its children, rather than resting merely silently and sullenly
passive, even as the extremists fantasize and dream, steeped in the
unlimited resentments and unlimited field of action that fantasy
allows, of war, jihad, and terror.
Yet even embracing Fukuyama’s psychological argument, it is
nonetheless wrong to conclude that the psychological argument
removes the argument for war for regime change or the attempt to
open possibilities for democratic transformation in the Middle East.
It does not, even if the Iraq war turns out to have been a disastrous
bet on transformative history. One reason among several is that the
location of terrorism’s spiritual development in the West is not all
there is to the story; psychology is not all there is to the story. The
dismaying role of corrupt, authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes
propping themselves up through ideological and religious appeal is
also an indispensable part of the story; it cannot be elided. The
corrosion of Saudi-financed Wahhabism across the world as the only
true Muslim faith likewise cannot be discounted. The manipulation
of Muslim masses by radical imams in Western Europe working with
Middle Eastern regimes in, for example, the Danish cartoon affair—
how did all those Danish flags so conveniently and quickly appear
for burning?55—is a small demonstration of the interaction between
individual alienation and the institutional failure of so many Muslim,
and particularly Arab, regimes. And along with, today, a massive

55. See Kenneth Anderson, Remarks by an Idealist on the Realism of the Limits
of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253, 267 n.28 (2006) (discussing
the publication of the cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in Danish newspapers,
liberal values, and multiculturalism).
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influx of oil money. The political conditions of the Middle East do
matter, both for themselves and for the flow-through to European
Muslim communities and elsewhere. The push for democracy in the
region produces consequences foreseeable and foreseen. The
democratic rise of Hamas and Hezbollah, both terrorist
organizations, is one.56 Another, Egyptian legal scholar Hesham Nasr
points out, is the rise of shari’a law among populations which,
having seen the failure of socialism and neo-liberalism to better their
lives, are willing to give at least parliamentary Islamism a chance.57
The issue, Nasr points out, is not so much whether they should be
allowed to give it a try but whether, having tried it and perhaps not
liking it, they will still have a political system that allows them to
give it up again; how, exactly, does a society give up God’s own
legal system? The bet on democratic transformation in the Middle
East might be good, might be bad, but contrary to what Fukuyama
thinks, it is not ruled off the table by his argument.

X
One of Fukuyama’s most telling observations in After the Neocons
is that neoconservatives, nurtured on security issues and preoccupied
with a narrow definition of American power, have not proved to be
very interested in or knowledgeable about international development
or, more broadly in a political rather than strictly economic context,
nation-building. Nation-building was pooh-poohed by Bush
56. I use the term “terrorist” here in its narrowest, least controversial
meaning—the one found, for example, in the High Level Panel’s Report to the
Secretary General on United Nations reform—the direct targeting of civilians. The
Report suggested that the definition of terrorism should include a number of
elements including a
description of terrorism as any action . . . that is intended to cause death or
serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such
an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing
any act.
Chairman, High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, Report Of The
High-Level Panel On Threats, Challenges And Change, Entitled “A More Secure
World : Our Shared Responsibility”, ¶ 164, in The Secretary-General, Note, U.N.
Doc A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
57. Hesham Nasr, Legal Reform and Modernization in the Arab Region (Apr.
5,
2006),
(video
available
through
http://www.wcl.american.edu/podcast/podcast.cfm?q=nasr).
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administration realists prior to 9/11, memorably by Secretary Rice
herself as then-foreign policy advisor to candidate Bush.58 The
poverty of neoconservative nation-building theory was all too
unfortunately on display in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam in
Iraq—the theory being based on a dismayingly naïve belief that
nation-building would take care itself, as it more or less had in
Eastern Europe, if only society were freed from dictatorship and
tyranny.
As for international development, neoconservatives have tended to
view it as either simply uninteresting or perhaps even with some
suspicion as an activity of international welfare, doomed to failure
and inefficiency, along with rent-seeking international organizations
that spend—that is to say, misspend—the monies. To the extent that
neoconservatives have views on international development, they are
merely extensions of conventional market-oriented, neo-liberal, and
free-trade economics, not deeply thought through and not considered
especially important in larger neoconservative political theory.
Following 9/11, too, there was a sense among neoconservatives—
certainly this was true in my conversations—that discussion of
international economic development in relation to terrorism was to
indulge the fallacy of thinking that terrorism was the result of
poverty. This was a sentiment which, to be sure, was indeed widely
indulged, especially on the left and even more among international
development organizations who would benefit from increased
budgetary attention. Still, among neoconservatives there has been a
certain inhibition in discussing development as a part of the strategy
of the war on terror specifically or American predominance in a
globalized world generally.

58. See Michael R. Gordon, Bush Would Stop U.S. Peacekeeping in Balkan
Fights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at A1 (quoting Secretary Rice as saying,
“[c]arrying out civil administration and police functions is simply going to degrade
the American capability to do the things America has to do. We don’t need to have
the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten”). While Al Gore described
himself as “a nation-builder and proud of it,” George Bush, in the second
presidential debate in October 2000 was skeptical: “I’m not so sure the role of the
United States is to go around the world and say ‘This is the way it’s got to be . . . I
just don’t think it’s the role of the United States to walk into a country, say, ‘We
do it this way; so should you.’” David E. Sanger, A Delicate Dance of the
Interventionist and the Reluctant Internationalist, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at
A25.
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Fukuyama argues that this double failure of neoconservatism to
have a theory of either nation-building or international development
is not only disappointing on its own—it is also tightly connected
with the failures of neoconservatism in Iraq and in the broader war
on terror. He is in a strong position to make this argument, having
devoted years to these issues, writing books and articles on both
subjects.59 So what, then, is the connection for Fukuyama between
each of these, the Iraq war, and Islamist terror?
It is not a surprise that Fukuyama titles his chapter on these
problems “Social Engineering and the Problem of Development” (F
2). Starting with the issue of nation-building and democratization,
Fukuyama is clear that the fundamental problem is that fostering
political institutions from the outside is an enormously difficult task,
if it is achievable at all within any particular society—and, we might
add, for all the reasons that Burke might have told us. It is an
instance of the neoconservative view that large-scale social
engineering, whether domestic or international, is an enterprise
highly fraught with a tendency toward unanticipated bad
consequences. Where such institutional growth has taken place, as in
post Cold War Eastern Europe, it was really the recovery of a
tradition and a culture put on hold, atrophied and stunted, but not
altogether lost, during the Soviet imperialism. The issue of Western
roots of the bourgeois-capitalist-democratic nexus is important, but
not always decisive—Japan and South Korea for example—and the
connection with a specifically British colonial inheritance might
likewise play a role (India for example) but not necessarily.
Whatever the complex cultural interplay that leads to political
systems characterized by market economies, bourgeois middle class
political predominance, democracy, individual rights and liberties,
and civil society—the impetus fundamentally comes from inside.
Assistance from the outside can help fund civil society, help fund
elections and election monitoring, assist in many tasks, but it cannot
take the place of cultural and social drivers from within.

59. Most recently, Fukuyama has made this as an argument for U.S.
international social and development initiatives to counter Venezuela’s Hugo
Chavez. See Francis Fukuyama, Op-Ed., Keeping Up With the Chávezes, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007, at A17.
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Fukuyama’s conclusions roughly mirror my own experience
working over the years for the Open Society Institute, Human Rights
Watch, the Media Development Loan Fund, and other organizations
of civil society support. The results of outside military intervention
followed by massive infusions of aid both economic and civil to
build stable societies are exceedingly mixed. The results are mixed
whether the outside actor is the United States, the European Union,
NATO, the United Nations, or anyone else. Even the places in which
conditions should have been reasonably bright—in which outside
intervention removed an outside military oppressor, such as in
Kosovo or East Timor, where outside intervention was welcomed by
the local population—have been dismaying. Kosovo, even as it
moves toward political independence, remains a basket case,
economically and socially, a permanent protectorate of the European
Union, and even East Timor—which was supposed to have been the
monument to the memory of Sergio Vieira de Mello, the great
Brazilian U.N. diplomat and peace-builder, who died in the 2003
terrorist attack on the United Nation’s Baghdad mission60—has
erupted in violence requiring the re-intervention of outside military
forces.61 The places in the 1990s that have permanently stabilized
and revitalized following wars is a short list: Croatia and Slovenia,
for example. It is not entirely clear that even Macedonia will remain
stable, and Serbia continues to be caught in the grip of a degenerate
fusion of left-over Milosevism and gangsterism. It is very hard to
square the paucity of success in nation-building in the post-Cold War
era with the large-scale successes that characterized the post-Second
World War—Germany and Japan, of course, but also India and
Spain.
Fukuyama emphasizes that building stable political and social
institutions is not just a question of political stability for its own
60. For a discussion of the conceptual problems underlying the U.N. operation
in Baghdad, see generally Kenneth Anderson, Humanitarian Inviolability in
Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for U.N. and NGO Agencies
Following the 2003–2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
41, 44–54 (2004).
61. Reports of the re-intervention of Austrialian troops to quell the recent
social unrest in East Timor can be found in Jane Perlez, Australian Forces
Intervene to Halt Fighting in East Timor, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A1, and
Shawn Donnan & Sundeep Tucker, Australian Troops Land in East Timor, FIN.
TIMES, May 26, 2006, at 10.
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sake. Leading theories of economic development increasingly stress
the role of stable, reasonably low-corruption national governments in
bringing about long-term economic development. Long-term poverty
reduction requires jobs, which require sustained economic growth,
which in turn requires large scale private investment, often from
diaspora capital62—vital lessons from China and India—which in
turn require some stability in the form of protection from rampant
corruption, and protection of property rights and the ability to realize
a real return on investment. Political instability of any kind causes
the flow of private investment to dry up with astonishing speed.
Large-scale international economic aid in public goods—education,
vaccination, public health, AIDS and malaria prevention and
treatment, electric power generation, etc.—are indispensable, but by
themselves they do not produce long-term sustainable economic
growth or income growth unless they have laid the foundation for
private direct investment. The two leading paradigms of international
economic development today—Jeffrey Sachs’ top-down model and
William Easterly’s bottom-up model—disagree on many points, but
they are in agreement on the basic proposition that the development
of stable national institutions is essential for long-term poverty
reduction; it cannot be by-passed on the way to permanent growth.63

62. See generally AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE (2003) (describing how global
capitalism and the diaspora of expatriates working in foreign countries fuels ethnic
tension and creates instability).
63. The difference between Sachs and Easterly might be characterized
metaphorically as the difference between the arterial system and the capillary
system in the body. Sachs believes that the main arterial systems of the economic
body, the large scale mechanisms for delivering aid, especially money, can flow
through to the desired economic micro-destinations. See JEFFREY SACHS, THE END
OF POVERTY (2005). Easterly, by contrast, believes that the capillary system is
essentially broken, and that flowing through more and more aid through the large
scale pipes will not get it to the specific locations where it can do the most good.
He therefore stresses the micro, retail, capillary by capillary approach to poverty
reduction. See WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH (2002);
WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN (2006). My own view, based on
my work over the past decade with the non-profit Media Development Loan
Fund—http://www.mdlf.org—which has developed a portfolio of investments in
developing world media of some U.S. $50 million, suggests to me that Easterly’s
bottom-up model is the better approach. For a discussion of what happens at the
“capillary,” micro-level of development, see Kenneth Anderson, Microcredit:
Fulfilling Or Belying The Universalist Morality Of Globalizing Markets?, 5 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85 (2002).
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The fact that neoconservatism has no special view on these
questions reveals, for Fukuyama, an inability of neoconservatism to
address a vital question of American security at the macro-level. In
an era of globalization, worldwide flows of capital, intellectual
capital, and labor, America’s place in the world—security in the
largest sense—must take account of the condition of the world’s
poorest people and poorest societies. If one needs a self-interested
reason, well, people will move from poor and insecure places to rich
ones—shifting demography and the large-scale migration of people
being one of the great narratives of the new century—with
unpredictable, and potentially destabilizing, results. Even at the
micro-level of security, failed states in particular represent a very
real threat to the United States, the threat of terrorist havens, as
Afghanistan under the Taliban demonstrated. Somalia, among other
places, might eventually come to be another. Even in a narrow
security sense, therefore, failed and failing states represent a
significant risk to security. The failure of neoconservatism to have a
real theory of either nation-building or international development is
ultimately a failure of security strategy.
It should be emphasized, however, that this is not to buy into the
poverty-breeds-terrorism paradigm. That paradigm has been widely
discredited by empirical research, and Fukuyama does not indulge it.
His view tracks instead that of Olivier Roy and others, locating
Islamist terror in the disjunction of Islam and modernity, not poverty.
Islamism is a function of ressentiment, not indigence. Poverty is
important as a characteristic of weak and failed states that provide
terrorism with the secure bases that any guerrilla movement needs in
order to thrive. The difficulty, which Fukuyama does not shy away
from, is that nation-building is a largely unproven exercise, at least if
it involves forces from the outside, and economic development is a
very long-term, fragile process which also involves significant
institutional factors that can only come from within a society. In
many cases, the United States cannot directly do this work—for
political and social reasons—and needs a proxy that is at once aimed
at the goals of nation-building and international development but is
not directly an agency or perceived as an agent of the United States.64
64. The contradictions of such a policy—contradictions between the values of
humanitarian neutrality and nation-building, among others—are discussed in
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Fukuyama recognizes that, however justified one’s reservations
about international organizations, public or non-governmental, as
rent-seeking, corrupt, inefficient, or simply anti-American, in many
circumstances only they can play that role. The United States needs
to learn how to better work with and fund them, and the failure of
neoconservatism to recognize this, in theory or practice, has meant
that it has ignored a vital question of U.S. foreign policy.
And yet I, at least, cannot find in this, by itself, a sufficient reason
to damn the Iraq venture out of hand. Iraq was not a failed state in
the classic sense, like Afghanistan, and the issue there was not
economic development, the needs of the world’s poorest people as
such. It was, rather, nation-building in the political sense.
Neoconservatism was here perhaps at its most inadequate and
mistaken—whatever else Iraq was, it was not Hungary, Poland, or
Czechoslovakia at the fall of the Wall, and only ideological blinders
could lead one to think it was. On the other hand, ought one to
liberate only those places in which the forces of internal civil society
are likely to produce today’s Hungary, Poland, or Czech Republic?
Or ought one to consider that it is the worst tyrants who should be
deposed, or at least be eligible to be deposed, particularly when they
threaten your security—I leave aside the factual arguments over that
proposition—even if it is not certain that the society that comes
afterwards has the internal tools by which to build a stable
democracy? The lack, or even the unlikelihood, of internal civil
society and latent institutions of liberal democracy should not
necessarily preclude a decision to remove the dictator—especially a
dictator whose evil against his own people and against other nations
has been, so to speak, world-class, and who has both been a threat to
you and threatens to do so again in the future. Why is not the time to
take him out in his moment of weakness—even if this turns out to be,
because of his weakness, precisely the moment when you might
conclude you least need to do so, or the moment when internal civil
society is also weak and the possibility of a stable future society
thereby the less?65
Anderson, supra note 60, at 64–71.
65. This leads directly, of course, into the debate over preemption and
preventative war. Fukuyama is not impressed with the arguments for prevention—
partly on principle, but largely because he thinks that the predicates are too easily
manipulated one way or the other. The most persuasive case for standards of
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XI
Each of the four steps in Fukuyama’s argument so far described
have very considerable merit as a critique of neoconservatism—a
genuinely comprehensive description and critique—even if they do
not decisively undermine, as Fukuyama believes they do, the
rationale for the Iraq war and a great deal of the “war” part of the
war on terror. Fukuyama’s final move, on the other hand—his
answer to what post-neoconservative policy should be—is
surprisingly unpersuasive. The book’s final section, at least by
comparison to the deft, precise argumentation that came before,
seems to wander and feel unsure of itself.
Fukuyama calls for a new American foreign policy paradigm
that—aware of the limitations of such sound bite terms but still in
need of a label—he calls “realistic Wilsonianism” (F 9). The
terminology seeks to conjoin differing aims of foreign policy, idealist
and realist strands; in that sense the term takes from other paradigms,
including moral realism and even neoconservatism itself, that seek
the good parts of both realism and idealism in foreign affairs. In
practice, however, what Fukuyama describes is almost
indistinguishable from familiar old liberal internationalism—but with
modestly less emphasis on formal international organizations—as he
makes a call for the United States to drop its muscular unilateralism
and ad hoc “coalitions of the willing.” Indeed, he even calls it that, in
a footnote saying that what is called “realistic Wilsonianism could be
alternatively described as a hard-headed liberal internationalism”(F
215 n.2). The deep contradictions of neoconservative foreign policy,
he says, can best—he understands that the fit will not be perfect, of
course, and so he carefully trims and hedges—be addressed by a
renewed and invigorated multilateralism.
What is hard-headed about this revived liberal internationalism?
First, he says, “the United States should work toward a multi-lateral
world, not give special emphasis to the United Nations” (F 215 n.2)
He therefore locates the source of multilateral legitimacy not in U.N.
preventative action, in a variety of settings and not just armed conflict, is ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS (2006). Dershowitz
examines preventative actions such as preemptive war, restrictions on speech, and
detention, and claims that absent any legal foundation, these actions pose a threat
to state sovereignty as well as civil liberty.
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institutions but in a looser configuration that is most easily described
by what it is not: more tightly multilateral than U.S.-led coalitions of
the willing but less so than the institutional United Nations. What
this actually amounts to in practice, however, is hard to say.
Certainly Fukuyama favors what many multilateralist critics of the
U.N. system have called for—the development of competing and
alternative systems of multilateral legitimacy, such as the so-called
“caucus of democracies.” Second, the goal of foreign policy should
not be the “transcendence of sovereignty and power politics but its
regularization through institutional constraints”(F 215 n.2). Thus,
while expressing reservations about the United Nations as being the
vehicle of that multilateralism, Fukuyama urges something that
amounts, in practice, to a special kind of multilateralism not in thrall
to existing international organizations. He says that the aim of this
multilateralism is not the transcendence of sovereignty. But the rest
of his argument about global governance—hard-headed liberal
internationalism—belies that or at least makes it appear, as the
saying goes, that he wants ten contradictory things before breakfast.
Well, which is it-democratic sovereignty or liberal internationalism?
Can you really have the best of both at once?
Every attractive foreign policy paradigm wants at least some
contradictory things, and is willing to risk some intellectual and
policy inconsistency in pursuit of the benefits of both idealism and
realism. The issue is when it crosses from forgivable inconsistency to
merely wishful thinking, foreign policy fantasy. It is easy to see how
Fukuyama’s dissection of the contradictions internal to
neoconservatism leads him to seek something new. But even
granting the force of his critique, it is hard to see how this “realistic
Wilsonianism,” amounting to internationalist idealism, actually
addresses the problems of neoconservatism while preserving its
strengths. It seems, rather, that Fukuyama is desperate for a new
paradigm whose purpose at bottom is simply to constrain American
neoconservatism from doing anything more. It is not a solution to
neoconservative contradictions, but an effort to quarantine it. While
many might applaud precisely such a move, it neither preserves
neoconservatism’s virtues which, even amidst a relentless critique,
Fukuyama is careful to catalogue, nor presents an alternative that,
well, amounts to anything. Renewed multilateralism? Greater
cooperation with our allies? Well and good and what else? It surely
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does not amount to a new paradigm. And anyway, neoconservatism
is unlikely to do anything more—it is effectively dead.

XII
With the 2006 Lebanon conflict and the growing crisis in Iran,
however, we enter a new phase in which seemingly nothing but the
hardest realism counts. The arguments over foreign policy idealism
suddenly seem as though from the distant past and far away.
Democracy? Who are we kidding?66 This “time of damned algebra,”
as the modernist poet and Resistance fighter Rene Char once
remarked of war in general and the Second World War in
particular.67 Iran acts through its proxy, Hezbollah, having tested and
found Western powers tired and weak; it has discovered in
multilateralism—multilateralism about security, rather than the far
less fraught multilateralism of trade and economic exchange—what
game theorists have long noted: vulnerability to free-riding players,
risks of tough but finally insincere diplomatic talk, and disastrous
defections from multilateral coalitions at key moments. Iran already
bets on the prestige of nuclear weapons it has yet actually to
complete; Syria likewise has tested and found the difference a year
makes in the will of international institutions.
The worn-down Bush administration sees today in multilateralism
and diplomacy—not just with Iran and Syria, but North Korea, too—
a way to sleep-walk through its remaining two years with the full
blessing of its multilateralist partners. It desperately wants nothing
more than to pass along any remaining foreign policy crises to the
next administration, and if it acts alone on Iran or North Korea, rest
assured it is not willingly. Quiescent Western Europe, for its part,
sees in multilateralism a way to make it through its old age without
66. Fukuyama has very recently warned that in the Iran debate, we risk a repeat
of what I have termed naïve neoconservatism—the conjoined beliefs that war
against the nuclear program of the Iranian regime can both cripple that program
and, moreover, that such a war would release the oppressed Iranian population
from the mullahs, for which they would presumably dance in the streets and thank
us. See Francis Fukuyama, Comment & Debate, The Neocons Have Learned
Nothing From Five Years of Catastrophe, GUARDIAN, Jan. 31, 2007, at 27.
67. RENE CHAR, LEAVES OF HYPNOS 20 (Cid Corman, trans., Grossman
Publishers 1973) (1946) (detailing his reflections during his time in the French
Underground in poetic form, Char’s Resistance code-name was Hypnos).
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its naptime dreams of a progressivist Golden Age led by the civilized
European Union being unduly disturbed by shooting in the global
streets or restiveness among its Muslim helot class. Israel has
through war called Hezbollah to account for its rocket attacks on
civilians and kidnapping of its soldiers, but the role of
multilateralism—of Europe and the United Nations—in this is
merely to forget about earlier Security Council resolutions sternly
calling to disarm Hezbollah and reach a ceasefire. The hard
calculations following the Hezbollah war have been whether a
multilateral force will be a means to quarantine, cordon off, and
disarm Hezbollah, or merely a wall behind which Hezbollah can
propagate its Katyushas—and still longer range rockets—
unmolested. Few expect that a cease-fire will hold in the long term
on the Lebanon-Israel border. Whatever in fact happens, these are
not the arguments of idealism. The billiard balls seemingly rebound
as realism would predict. No one, apparently, has time anymore for
idealism; neoconservative arguments over democracy and freedom
and transformative moral and political change of even a year ago
seem quite quaint, dead in the midst of disasters in Iraq, a new
Middle East war, and Iranian nuclearization.
Neoconservatism, let us be absolutely clear, is over as an
intellectual and moral movement. The king is dead. Foreign policy
idealism is not dead, to be sure, on the right or the left—and by all
means, let us resist la barbarie a visage humain of the new liberal
realism68—but neoconservatism is over. It has died partly from its
failures in Iraq, its failure to plan for nation-building and not just
regime-change, and its failure to anticipate the primacy of ethnicity,
religion, tribe, and clan over modernity’s political categories; partly
from the new circumstances of hard-headed, hard-hearted war in the
Middle East; partly from the exhaustion of its intellectuals trying to
hold together the internal contradictions of the theory (as happens
eventually, of course, with every paradigm); and partly because its
core strengths have actually been absorbed by other paradigms of
foreign policy that are not so publicly connected with its failures.
Intellectuals at first edged away from it—too quickly would have
been unseemly, but the whiff of naiveté that envelops it is deadly to
68. Borrowing from BERNARD-HENRI LEVY, BARBARISM WITH A HUMAN
FACE (George Holoch, trans., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 1979) (1977).
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intellectual reputation, and so now the herd has hurried on—even as
they carry with them large parts of it into other, newer foreign policy
models.69 The king is dead—nevertheless, long live the king.
Neoconservative ideas will live on, in other words, and in some
seemingly unlikely places, places where idealists continue to gather,
even if under other names.
And it would be a profound mistake, not to mention intellectually
dishonest, to write off neoconservatism’s insights too quickly. Does
anyone anymore doubt, for example, that the internal character of a
regime matters, often decisively, in assessing the external threats it
presents to the world? Does anyone really believe—really believe—
that the threat of North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, for
example, will ever be finally solved except by what Nicholas
Eberstadt, in his eponymous book, called simply The End of North
Korea?70 Neoconservatism has many failings, yes, but it does have
the virtue of knowing that “containment”—today so beloved as the
narrative of What Went Wrong In Iraq, especially in The Good
Fight—must mean something more than mere accommodation,
permanent accommodation, of tyranny and brutality. Otherwise it is
containment that becomes merely liberation in theory, never in
practice, eschatological liberation, liberation never today, but only
liberation in the end-time, liberation at (shall we say it?) the end of
history and the last man.
Where in either Fukuyama or Beinart do we see a hint of criteria
for distinguishing one from the other? What in their theories
indicates that containment must someday cease to be accommodation
and come to an end in transformation? Only when Russia, China,
France, and Britain all agree with the United States while sitting
together at U.N. headquarters? For otherwise we have arrived at

69. Consider the use, for example, to which Timothy Garton Ash—scarcely a
neoconservative—puts the pro-Middle East democracy argument in this Guardian
column, A Little Democracy is a Dangerous Thing, GUARDIAN, Aug. 3, 2006, at
31. His point is that the “next US president may give up on democratization. But
we shouldn’t. It’s still our best hope.” Id. He, however, means that as reason to
negotiate with Hamas and Hezbollah, which is not precisely what American
neoconservatives have in mind.
70. NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, THE END OF NORTH KOREA (1999). Eberstadt
argues that the bifurcation of Korea is unsustainable, and, therefore, the two
Koreas are destined to reunite, bringing the end of North Korea.
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nothing more than Kissingerian realism, declinism, and the endlessly
cynical accommodation of dictators, forever Truman and never
Reagan.71 All this intellectual and moral energy, for that? The
insight, after all, which neoconservatism shares with all the other
idealisms, is that we are all idealists now. Even the realists among us
put their realism at the service of some form of idealism—to temper
fatal idealist enthusiasm, yes, but not to deny it altogether.72 The
problem is, the idealism that Fukuyama puts forth—this “realistic
Wilsonianism”—seems to combine merely the vices of
multilateralism and liberal internationalism with the vices of realism.
And this is when one can figure out what it actually means in
practice, rather than being simply a description of what it is not, viz.,
neoconservatism.73
It is—and this is a harsh judgment, but no harsher than
Fukuyama’s judgment on neoconservatism—best described as
ineffectual internationalism, internationalism taking refuge in its
ineffectuality. It is an idealism that seems doomed from the outset to
be stalwartly, heroically internationalist in precisely the ways that
most ensure its ineffectiveness. Darfur? The New York Times
Magazine a few months ago ran perhaps its saddest cover story in
years—the international community will not prevent genocide in
Darfur, it said, so instead let us get on with preparing criminal trials
for the perpetrators we were unwilling to stop in the first place.74 I
71. Fukuyama, watching his back, as it were, is careful to argue that, contrary
to neoconservative hagiography, Reagan was not really responsible for winning the
Cold War and bringing down Soviet Communism. FUKUYAMA, supra note 2, at
58–59 (describing a multitude of factors in addition to Reagan’s “principled
anticommunism,” such as “the illegitimacy of the governing ideology” and “the
untimely death of Yuri Andropov and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev,”that
contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union).
72. See the discussion of the range of forms of idealism in Kenneth Anderson,
Squaring The Circle: Reconciling Sovereignty And Global Governance Through
Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1259–68 (2005).
73. And if this is true of Fukuyama, it is only that much more true of the far
less sophisticated Beinart.
74. Elizabeth Rubin, If Not Peace, Then Justice, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 2,
2006, at 42. The cover page of the issue lamented, “[t]he U.N. is not going to stop
the genocide in Darfur. The African Union is not going to stop the genocide in
Darfur. The U.S. is not going to stop the genocide in Darfur. NATO is not going to
stop the genocide in Darfur. The European Union is not going to stop the genocide
in Darfur. But someday, Luis Moreno-Ocampo is going to bring those who
committed the genocide to justice.” Id. at front cover. More recently and
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say, why bother? It is morally corrupt, wicked even, to stand and
watch genocide go by, while comforting oneself with a stern but
vague promise to arrest some people after it is over. It is, however, a
stellar example of the vices of internationalism, on the one hand—
dithering with much hortatory diplomacy barely concealing great
power interests—and realism, on the other—the billiard balls cannot
possibly rebound to the good, and trying to make it so will only make
it worse. Which is to say, neoconservatism may be dead, and its
autopsy expertly and clinically performed, but neither Fukuyama nor
Beinart offers a remotely plausible or attractive alternative to the
corpse: theirs, too, are dead on arrival.
A British foreign secretary, so I once read, addressed a Commons
debate on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, remarking that there
“are two kinds of sanctions—the ineffective, which are not worth
putting on, and the effective, which lead to war. Which, gentlemen,
do you prefer?”75 Paraphrasing Churchill, they preferred the first and
got the second. Neoconservatism, by contrast, preferred war in
Iraq—naively confusing the removal of an evil regime with quick
and painless democratic transformation, which it has not found. But
some neoconservatives not so naively believed that, over the long
run, the realist strategy of accommodation and containment of
corrupt, authoritarian Middle East regimes—stability at all the moral
costs of the past thirty years—merely feeds the beast.

disturbingly, some have argued that this very threat has been a factor in causing the
Sudan government to resist an international force in Darfur. See David Rademaker,
Unwitting Party to Genocide, WASH. POST, Jan. 11. 2007, at A25.
75. Having read this in a law review footnote many years ago, I am unable to
locate a cite for it. I therefore refer to it here not as history but as a parable. If any
reader is aware of a source for this perhaps apocryphal incident, I would be
grateful to learn of it.

